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Ukraine’s Yom Kippur War strategy is working in Kursk

Ukraine’s bold incursion into Russia’s Kursk region has created a major shift in the dynamic of the conflict between the two countries. The offensive has now moved beyond Kursk to the Belgorod region, and Ukraine announced the “largest mass capture” of Russian troops — over 100 surrendering — since the conflict began in February 2022. 

In a conflict that has created so much misery for Ukrainians, the shocking move by its military to take the fight to the enemy has energized their troops and citizens.  

History sometimes offers lessons from the past, and the Kursk offensive recalls a similarly daring move by Israel in the Yom Kippur War of 1973

In that war, Israel was initially on its back foot, having been surprised by an invasion from both its north and south. On the holiest Jewish holiday, Syrian tanks rolled down from the Golan Heights while a coordinated attack by the Egyptians into the Sinai desert took the Israelis by surprise. 

The Arabs made significant progress in their campaign. At no time in the many wars waged against it was Israel in greater peril.  

After a few days of terrible losses, Israel began to steady itself and halted the attacker’s momentum. But if it was going to turn the tide of the war, it had to do something audacious. The strategy to cross the Suez Canal and take the fight into Egypt was conceived.  

Under heavy artillery fire, as well as bombing and strafing from Egyptian planes, General Ariel Sharon’s troops made the crossing and began to pour into Egypt. The Israelis had noted a gap between the Egyptian Second and Third Armies and began a plan to isolate the latter. 

As their plan started to work, the Egyptians and the international community began to panic. The Israelis were in a position to destroy the Third Army as they cut off its supply lines and drew closer to Suez City, with the Egyptian heartland and its capital, Cairo, in their sights.  

In Russia, the expansion of the war to Belgorod echoes the early gains made by the Israelis. The sluggish Russian response has alarmed the local population, of whom more than 100,000 are now displaced.  

The Russians are in their element fighting along the entrenched lines that have hardened in southern Ukraine. But they don’t do dynamic change on the battlefield very well, and fighting off this creative new approach by highly motivated Ukrainian soldiers has proven difficult. Russia is mobilizing troops and has vowed to reverse the embarrassing success of the Ukrainian offensive, but in many ways, the Ukrainians have already succeeded. 

Moscow is only a little over 300 miles from these front lines. Although few think that Russia’s capital will actually be threatened, its proximity to the fighting is an embarrassment. It might be enough to change the tide of the war to take the fight deep into Russia, just as the Israelis did by crossing the Suez and menacing the heart of the Egyptian army and its major cities.  

The Israeli offensive in Egypt changed the course of the war. With Egypt suddenly threatened so specifically, the two superpowers supporting each country — the Soviets backing the Egyptians and the Americans behind the Israelis — both grew concerned that they would be pulled in. The potential destruction of the Egyptian Third Army and the threat to Suez City and Cairo turned calls for an armistice into a din.  

It’s hard to predict how that might play out similarly in the Russia/Ukraine conflict, but Ukraine has suggested it could try to hold much of the territory it has gained and negotiate for its withdrawal in return for Russia leaving the Ukrainian territory it has captured

Ukraine is showing signs of consolidating its gains in Kursk, and if it can repel a furious Putin and his beleaguered troops, that strategy might prove fruitful.  

Putin is in a different position than Anwar Sadat, Egypt’s leader at the time. Sadat, and Syria’s leader Hafez al-Assad, were trying more than anything to restore Arab pride after their humiliating defeat in the Six-Day War of 1967

Once the military momentum was halted, and certainly when they faced true peril from the Israeli counteroffensive, a negotiated peace made sense. They had bloodied the Israelis and penetrated the Israeli hubris that had developed after their success in previous wars of aggression against it.  

But for Putin, such peace might be his downfall. If he is pushed to the negotiating table by a successful Ukrainian offensive that captures Russian territory Moscow cannot win back, it would penetrate Putin’s air of invincibility. This cloak of fear has stifled his critics, even though Putin’s image has taken a hit over his halting campaign against Ukraine. 

The Russians are being forced to pull soldiers from their pool of approximately 300,000 conscripts, but that isn’t a great strategy for Putin either. They are poorly trained and have been promised they wouldn’t be thrust into the charnel house of the Ukraine conflict. 

There are reports of mothers livid at having their sons thrown into the battle and feeling betrayed. Such aggrieved mothers played a role in the Soviet Union pulling out of their quagmire in Afghanistan, leading toward that empire’s fall.  

War is often about measuring risk. If Russia can’t stop the Ukrainian advance or push them out of the territory they hold, would Putin make good on his threat to use a tactical nuclear weapon? He might be tempted to consider this, though it would likely lead to a rift in his vital alliance with China. 

Putin’s anger at his country’s impotence could lead to an increase in attacks on Ukrainian civilians and infrastructure, though Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky has said that part of the reason for the invasion was to create a buffer zone and diminish Russia’s ability to attack across the border.

Whatever the outcome, the Ukrainian offensive is a daring gambit, one that history shows us can be very effective when it comes to taking the fight to your enemy and upending their strategy and war gains.   

Jeremy Hurewitz is the head of Interfor Academy and the author of the forthcoming book “Sell Like a Spy.”

Tags Arab-Israeli relations Belgorod region Egypt General Ariel Sharon Israel Kursk Kursk region Politics of Ukraine russia Russo-Ukrainian War Six-Day War of 1967 Soviet Union Suez Canal ukraine Vladimir Putin Volodymyr Zelensky

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