What the world can expect from the new Cold War

As the battle for Ukraine rages, analysts are considering its impact on the geopolitical system. Many believe we are in a new Cold War. The challenge will be to keep that conflict from turning hot. 

To understand this new Cold War, it is worth considering how it resembles and differs from the old one.  

The United States emerged victorious from World War II with a fond hope that the wartime coalition would remain intact to ensure world peace. That hope soon proved forlorn. The Soviet Union was determined to establish puppet regimes in every country occupied by the Red Army. In 1946, Winston Churchill declared that an “iron curtain” was descending across Europe. The 1948-49 Berlin blockade and airlift confirmed the division of Europe into two armed camps. The western allies formed the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1949, and the Soviets responded with the Warsaw Pact in 1955.   

{mosads}The alliances might have come to blows were it not for a powerful deterrent — nuclear weapons. By the early 1960s, analysts had coined the term “Mutual Assured Destruction” (MAD) to describe the strategic stalemate. Since the adversaries possessed enough hydrogen bombs to destroy one another, no one could win a war, so there was no point fighting one. China joined the nuclear club in 1964, expanding the Cold War to Asia.  

While nuclear deterrence prevented Armageddon, it could not stop the numerous proxy wars that marked the era. Washington backed Israel and Moscow supported Egypt. When the U.S. got bogged down in Southeast Asia, the Soviets and Chinese supplied North Vietnam with weapons and other aid. The U.S. in turn equipped Afghan insurgents with Stinger antiaircraft missiles to use against Soviet occupiers during the 1980s. Both sides supported client states in Africa, Asia, and Latin America.   

Today, the Ukrainian-Russian war has many of the hallmarks of the old Cold War engagements. Moscow’s nuclear arsenal deters direct intervention by the United States and its NATO allies, just as it prevented support for the 1956 Hungarian Revolt or the 1968 Prague Spring. Nuclear deterrence does not, however, stop the alliance from supplying weapons to the Ukrainian military. President Zelenskyy’s call for establishing a no-fly zone over his country has been firmly refused and a plan to provide Polish MiG-29 fighter jets was quashed for fear of provoking Russia. But NATO continues to supply the Ukrainian military with Stinger and Javelin missiles, 50 caliber sniper rifles and other armaments.   

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Though it has some similarities with earlier conflicts, the current war is being fought in a vastly different context. The world has become far more complex since the end of the Cold War in 1989. Despite its still considerable power, the Russian Federation is a shadow of its former Soviet self. China has increased its power exponentially and now poses a greater threat to the United States. Before invading Ukraine, Putin was careful to secure at least tacit support from Xi Jinping, something Soviet commissars never would have done. Unlike its ally, China plays a long game, seeking economic hegemony and extending its territorial reach only as safe opportunities to do so arise.  

Not only is the strategic landscape different than it was 30 years ago, but the world is also more integrated. During the Cold War, the communist and capitalist blocs operated as more or less autonomous economic zones. Today, all nations are integrated into a global web of trade, commerce and finance. That interdependence makes an aggressor vulnerable to economic pressure, but it exacts a price on those who exert it. President Biden rallied the NATO allies and much of the international community to impose crippling sanctions on Russia, but those measures will have a significant cost in rising gas and commodities prices and volatility in financial markets. As these consequences impact consumers, support for sanctions may wane.  

The domestic landscape has also changed. Although they disagreed on policy particulars, Democratic and Republican administrations during the Cold War made containing China and Russia their number one foreign policy priority and viewed the Atlantic alliance as the lynchpin of U.S. security. They argued over who was tougher on communism. That consensus has evaporated. Donald Trump’s “America first” platform encouraged disengagement abroad. Trump alienated NATO allies and pursued a policy of conciliation rather than confrontation with Putin. More than 70 percent of Americans favor sanctions, but that support could wane as pain at the pump bites harder.   

Economic interdependence and the complex global security environment make it unlikely that the world could again be divided into two or even three armed camps for a sustained period. China accounts for more than a quarter of global manufacturing and more than 20 percent of U.S. imports. Russia produces 10 percent of the world’s oil and supplies nearly 40 percent of Europe’s natural gas. It also exports gems, gold, platinum and palladium. Russia relies on U.S. technology and China is the third-largest market for U.S. exports.   

{mossecondads}The new Cold War will probably be a protracted chill rather than a deep freeze. Russia will be isolated for months, possibly longer. Once he has conquered Ukraine, Putin may invade Moldova and Georgia, but doing so will prolong the pain for Russia. After that, he will have nowhere to go without provoking a war with NATO. The longer the sanctions remain in place, the more likely Russia’s trading partners will find alternative sources of energy and raw materials and unrest will topple Putin. Anti-war protests have already taken place across Russia and 13,000 people have been detained.  

Rational predictions about international relations must consider the dangers of miscalculation and the human capacity for irrational behavior. Twice during the Cold War, the U.S. and Soviet Union nearly came to blows through misunderstanding one another’s intentions: the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis and the 1983 cruise missile crisis. 

With Putin, the danger is that an unhinged, increasingly paranoid dictator could deploy nuclear weapons based on an imaginary threat rather than a real one. In dealing with him, we must act firmly but tread lightly.  

Tom Mockaitis is a professor of History at DePaul University and the author of “Violent Extremists: Understanding the Domestic and International Terrorist Threat” and “Iraq and the Challenge of Counterinsurgency.”