Yes, the US and its allies can stop Putin

America’s experience in its post-9/11 wars has not prepared its political and military leaders well for this moment in history, especially when it comes to ending wars. In Afghanistan, our departure was precipitous, leaving the Taliban to retake the country. In Iraq, the U.S. left thinking the war was over, only to return when ISIS threatened Baghdad. In the Ukraine war, the U.S. and its allies must get it right. That means creating a sustainable, stable post-fighting arrangement among warring parties; otherwise, aggression will have succeeded, and the seeds of future conflict will have been sown.

The fundamental question that allied political and military leaders must answer first is this:  What is a satisfactory end for the Ukraine war? Describing the desired aims will align Ukraine’s and the allies’ actions — military and diplomatic. Then, political and military leaders can answer the equally important, but derivative, question of how to achieve the desired aims.

For Ukraine, the most probable political aims include re-establishing the military status quo before Russian President Vladimir Putin’s illegal aggression that began on Feb. 24. Perhaps Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky also would want Russia to abandon Crimea and the occupied areas of the Donbas. But this maximal territorial goal is unlikely to get allied support — at least in the near term. Ukrainian leaders also are likely to seek guarantees to its political sovereignty and against future Russian predation — not from NATO but through some yet-to-be-created security arrangement. And Ukraine’s leaders probably would desire payments or loan guarantees to help repair the damages and displacements Putin’s war has caused. The Zelensky government might have other aims, but these appear to be core.

American and NATO leaders likely would support all of this, as long as achieving these aims does not widen or escalate the fighting. This is what “we stand with you, period” means. Thus, NATO’s primary focus is more concerned with the derivative question of “how,” rather than the fundamental question of “what.”

Putin, of course, wants none of this. His minimum goal is a Korea-style permanent partition, with an eye to finishing the job he started in February now or at some future date. Ukraine’s territorial integrity and political sovereignty mean nothing to him. He invaded to destroy both.  The only reason he has signaled anything short of Ukrainian subjugation is that he met greater force in the forms of Ukraine resistance, NATO military assistance, and Western sanctions. But it’s not over. Putin will not just give in. He wants Russian troops on Ukrainian soil to negotiate his way to attaining his minimal aim.

As President Biden recently made clear: This is a war that the West cannot afford to lose.  Otherwise, a “force-based” international order will have prevailed. American and NATO leaders must help Ukraine achieve its minimum aims, which, in turn, means more force — the force of continued sanctions and the force of a general counter-offensive. 

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Russian units must be forcibly ejected to their pre-February 2022 positions. Ukraine’s resistance, with allied help, has taken the tactical initiative from Russia. Western sanctions have reduced Putin’s strategic initiative significantly. But operational initiative remains up for grabs. Putin is trying to seize it with his shift to the east. Ukraine and the allies can’t let that happen. They must grasp the operational initiative by starting a general counter-offensive soon — one that includes sequential attacks to eject Russian troops; interdicting Russia’s ability to refit and reposition; and preventing Russian expansion in the east and south. A successful counter-offensive will provide Ukrainian leverage necessary for negotiations. 

The U.S. and NATO must commit to supporting whatever intelligence and military equipment Ukraine needs for these counter-offensive and interdiction operations. And they must do so at a sustained rate. Without this, Russia will hold its positions, bombard at the tactical level, and reposition its troops operationally to make a permanent partition a more likely outcome.  

The Ukraine war is at a point where fighting and negotiating must complement one another. It’s not “either/or.” Wrong is the belief that a lull in fighting would be good for negotiations. The opposite is true. Creative diplomacy works better when it’s backed by an enhanced force position. The allies should not pressure Ukraine’s leaders to negotiate too early. Right now, Putin is weak and knows it. He is trying to create a window for his forces to refit or reconstitute and then reposition without pressure. Neither the allied leaders nor Ukraine should give Putin this opportunity. All must keep the pressure on Putin — in Russia and on the battlefield.

Of course, no decision in war is risk-free. Putin will continue to threaten to widen the war or escalate with chemical and nuclear weapons. But NATO is positioned now to mitigate, even deter, these risks. NATO has improved its ground, air and naval force posture in the east and increased the readiness levels of its forces. And it has plenty of forces in reserve. Putin also will continue to pound Ukraine’s cities and citizens. This is why NATO should protect delivery of humanitarian assistance — initially and at a minimum, in western Ukraine. 

There’s also a risk that a successful counter-offensive would put Putin in a corner, making him more dangerous. But, war is all about putting your enemy in an untenable position, and then taking advantage of it. Grant put Lee in just such a corner at the end of America’s Civil War, as did the Allies with Hitler and Hirohito in the final campaigns of World War II. Ukraine’s general counter-offensives could do this to Putin; the U.S. and NATO should put its full support behind them. 

That is what winning looks like. The U.S. and NATO haven’t seen it in a while. The allies should not be afraid of stopping Putin. This is the test of their time. James M. Dubik, Ph.D., a retired lieutenant general of the U.S. Army, is a senior fellow at the Institute for the Study of War. He served in military command and operational roles in Bosnia, Haiti and Iraq, and helped train forces in Afghanistan, Japan, South Korea, Thailand, Honduras, and many NATO countries.