The Biden administration initially was slow to ramp up military assistance to Ukraine, despite urgent pleas from President Volodymyr Zelensky, who reportedly uttered the now-famous retort, “I need ammunition, not a ride” when Washington offered to evacuate him a day after Russia invaded his country. Once it became clear that Ukraine would not fold in a matter of a few days, as Russian President Vladimir Putin had anticipated, the Biden administration not only spearheaded a Western move to impose increasingly tougher economic sanctions on Moscow, but also belatedly stepped up its military aid and that of its allies and partners.
Washington also expanded its objectives. Initially, the Biden administration had sought to help Ukraine hold off Russia’s incursion, especially its efforts to seize Kyiv. In a joint news conference with Secretary of State Antony Blinken on April 25, however, Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin went much further, stating, “We want to see Russia weakened to the degree that it can’t do the kinds of things that it has done in invading Ukraine.”
Critics of American policy have pounced on Austin’s message. Some have argued that Washington is essentially advocating regime change in Moscow, implying that the effort ultimately will prove no more successful than those in Afghanistan or Iraq. Others, including Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, assert that the United States and NATO are engaging in “a proxy war” with Russia.
Still others go even further, arguing that the United States is now a full-fledged combatant. And virtually all critics agree that in speaking so bluntly about America’s aims, Austin has backed Putin into a corner from which the only way out could well be Russian employment of tactical or even theater nuclear weapons.
Austin has shrugged off such fears — and he is right to do so. President Biden may have helped to create these apprehensions when he publicly worried that even an indirect confrontation with Russia, such as the transfer of MiGs to Ukraine under American auspices, could lead to World War III. Yet, while it has not transferred aircraft to Ukraine, Washington is now providing increasingly heavy equipment to Kyiv, and encouraging its allies and partners to do the same. In that vein it also has organized a contact group of some 40 states — including initially reluctant Germany and Israel — to coordinate arms supplies to Ukraine. But World War III has not yet broken out.
Putin and those generals whom he has not yet fired will have to think long and hard before employing nuclear, or even chemical, weapons in their effort to subjugate Ukraine. They will need to consider whether doing so would bring the United States and NATO into the war at a time when Russia has suffered heavy losses of both personnel and armaments. They also must consider whether Washington would unleash its own nuclear capability in response to any Russian use of such weapons.
In either case, Putin would have to consider whether he could politically survive an all-out war with the West. In other words, by launching non-conventional weaponry against Ukraine, Putin may find that he will have brought about the very regime change he accuses the West of plotting against him.
Armchair psychologists assert that Putin is mad, that he would be willing to risk nuclear war in order to achieve his dream of restoring the Russian Empire. There is no evidence that Putin is ready to take that risk. On the other hand, Putin would not be the first leader in history to miscalculate his prospects of successfully invading another country — and not all those who did were certifiably unstable. On the contrary, Putin appears to be seeking to maximize Russia’s position on the ground in Ukraine prior to suiting up at the negotiating table.
Washington’s response to Putin’s war aims should be to convince him that his forces will not succeed, however long they might fight. That, in essence, is what Austin signaled to Moscow this week. He was right to do so. The administration must now make good on Austin’s remarks and ensure that weeks or months from now his powerful words do not prove to have been little more than hollow threats.
Dov S. Zakheim is a senior adviser at the Center for Strategic and International Studies and vice chairman of the board for the Foreign Policy Research Institute. He was under secretary of Defense (comptroller) and chief financial officer for the Department of Defense from 2001 to 2004 and a deputy under secretary of Defense from 1985 to 1987.