As Congress considers major defense policy and spending bills this summer, it should start paying closer attention to an Army procurement program that is just getting off the ground: the Future Long Range Assault Aircraft, or FLRAA. If done right, the FLRAA helicopter, the successor to the venerable Black Hawk, will provide a revolutionary upgrade to the Army’s vertical lift capability in range, speed, agility and overall performance.
Congress controls the purse strings and it has a vital role in oversight of the FLRAA program. The helicopter the Army selects must be affordable, producible and sustainable, and it must meet the operational needs of ground force commanders. The Army will choose a winner between the Sikorsky/Boeing team or Bell sometime in the next few months.
How the Army measures and evaluates key attributes of the mission is vital. The long-range assault aircraft, first and foremost, must perform air assault operations. From my time as an Army Aviator, this means massing combat power — infantry, artillery, supplies — on the objective. That is the only way to achieve the element of surprise and overwhelm the foe. An air assault is not a single aircraft mission; it is a multi-aircraft mission that requires certain flight dynamics to maximize the number of aircraft in a landing zone. This equates to combat power, which is important to every infantryman on board.
Speed, range and maneuverability also are important as the Army extends its operational reach in every theater. Speed must be evaluated at tactical altitudes. Against a near-peer threat, that is under 100 feet — quite different from counter-insurgency operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, where missions were flown around 1,500 feet.
Infrared and radar guided missiles are now the key threat. Flying very low allows a helicopter to mask in the “clutter” of terrain and avoid radar and line of sight. Maneuverability is also a critical component to mission performance and survivability, allowing helicopters with agility to support the ground force in and around the objective area, the most common scenario.
The cost of the program is a key consideration and takes on many forms. Congress, specifically its defense committees and subcommittees, must ask questions that address both acquisition and total cost. This is something that is always mentioned but rarely addressed in a meaningful way. Failure to clearly examine costs up front results in everyone — Congress, the armed services, and taxpayers — paying more in time, effort and dollars.
Total cost, at a minimum, includes training for pilots, mechanics and units, military construction costs, maintenance and operations. Total cost can negatively impact operations and doctrine in ways that are not intuitive but are real nevertheless. Ask the Marine Corps about unanticipated costs associated with fielding the V-22, for example. It took the Marines 20 years to work through the challenges and costs associated with changes to operations, training, infrastructure and employment. We would be foolish not to learn from this experience.
A budget-constrained Army needs a FLRAA aircraft that will not require additional facilities, longer or more complex training, or bigger sustainment chains.
When I served in Congress, I heard a lot about maintaining the health of the defense industrial base. Its health is essential to maintain a ready force with validated production capabilities, a robust supply chain, and close alignment with the armed services. Congress does not need to maintain an industrial base from the 1980s; we need to work with current innovators who can accelerate design and delivery.
Production is keenly important. Hot production lines and dedicated suppliers reduce risks. The Army has had failed Aviation programs in the past because aircraft could not be produced in a cost-effective manner, meet the required capabilities, or deliver according to schedule. Congress must ensure the Army avoids these pitfalls this time around.
Army Aviation must incorporate lessons learned. The American soldier must be able to win the fight now, considering current threats. That means procuring a helicopter that achieves the objective of an air assault mission — massing soldiers and combat capability on the mission objective. Congress and the Army must ask the hard questions to ensure the capability they choose is affordable and transformational in every aspect, providing our soldiers with the best tools to accomplish their missions and return home safely.
Geoff Davis, a Republican, represented Kentucky’s 4th Congressional District from 2005 to 2012. He is a former Army Aviator and was a member of the House Armed Services and Ways and Means committees.