The US and China should prioritize peace over Taiwan

In 1987, I wrote an op-ed article for the Los Angeles Times about the conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union over the Star Wars missile system. The year before, disagreement on Star Wars had caused the breakup of the Reykjavik summit between Presidents Gorbachev and Reagan, after both leaders had been unwilling to give ground. Yet, at their next summit in Washington, the two presidents set aside that disagreement and signed an important arms control treaty that eliminated intermediate-range nuclear forces.   

Reagan and Gorbachev had removed Star Wars from the forefront, where it had been at Reykjavik, and placed it on their back burners. I called this technique “Taiwanization,” which I defined as:    

“The process by which the United States and a major communist foe, sharing a commitment to improving their relationship, reduce the importance that they’d given a once-intractable problem — without solving the problem. In this way, they agree to keep disagreeing while not allowing the disagreement to keep them from getting along much better. (Anyone who has been involved in a successful marriage knows how this process works.)” 

“Taiwanization” was needed because the United States and China had — and still have — diametrically opposed views on the status of Taiwan, the island to which the Nationalist side fled with two million followers in 1949 when the Communists conquered mainland China. From those first days, Beijing considered Taiwan to be an integral part of China, with which they would someday reunite.  

The U.S. government, for its part, continued to recognize the Nationalists in Taiwan as rulers of the mainland. However, after Nixon went to China in 1972, the U.S. conceded that Beijing was the legitimate government of China. In addition, the Americans agreed to end diplomatic relations with Taiwan, to provide the Taiwanese with only limited defensive weapons and not to station troops on the island. Those arrangements were carefully negotiated by the Nixon, Ford and Carter administrations — and mostly adhered to by subsequent administrations.

Nevertheless, the American bottom line, on which it has never budged, was that Taiwan should not be ruled by Beijing.    

Still, until recent years, neither the U.S. nor China wanted the issue of Taiwan to interfere with having good relations. Therefore, without resolving the basic difference over who would control Taiwan, Washington and Beijing agreed that there was only “One China.” While both governments interpreted the phrase differently, its vagueness served to paper over their differences.   

That worked fine while the original Nationalist leaders remained in power with dreams of retaking the mainland. However, as democracy thrived and old guard leaders died off, popular sentiment in Taiwan turned toward permanent separation from China. In the last few years, the Taiwanese desire for full divorce has been reinforced by China’s failure to live up to the “one country, two systems” promises it made regarding Hong Kong. The Chinese, for their part, have become increasingly bellicose, as prospects for peaceful reunification, following the Hong Kong model, diminished, and as relations between China and the U.S. have soured. 

Given all this, it is not out of the question that China might decide to use military force against Taiwan, particularly in view of statements by President Biden of U.S. support for Taiwan and, most recently, in reaction to the visit of House Speaker Nancy Pelosi (D-Calif.) to the island. Unless something is done to restore the “strategic ambiguity” of the earlier agreements, the U.S. might have to choose between defending Taiwan or reneging on an implicit commitment to its security that has been in place for more than 70 years. 

Without getting into who is right and who is wrong about Taiwan’s status, the first priority should be to avoid a disastrous war. It would seem that the best possible solution now would be to revert to the status quo ante. As occurred 50 years ago when Chinese and American leaders felt they had more important matters to attend to, both countries would be wise to move Taiwan to a lower place on their priority list. That would require a shared acceptance that maintaining peace would be in everyone’s best interest. It would also require the Taiwanese to curb their enthusiasm for full independence, and for the United States to stop actions that the Chinese consider provocative, as it originally promised to do. These would include not providing Taiwan with offensive weapons and not sending high-level officials on visits. The Chinese, for their part, would have to exercise patience about the possibility of reunification.    

In other words, what is needed is the re-Taiwanization of Taiwan.  

John Marks is managing director of Confluence International.  He was the founder and former president of Search for Common Ground, the world’s largest non-profit peacebuilding and conflict prevention organization.