The violent death of al-Qaida leader Ayman al-Zawahiri, reportedly carried out by a U.S. air strike, was justified, legal and well executed. Some proponents of this approach will point to the strike as proof that an “over the horizon” strategy is sufficient for stopping terrorist attacks. We should view such claims with skepticism.
Clearly, the intelligence community had impressively precise intelligence on where Zawahari would be and when. Reports indicated that the strike occurred as he was standing on the balcony of the house he had not left since April, suggesting the U.S. had the house under consistent surveillance. CNN reported that “the President was first briefed in April on U.S. intelligence placing Zawahiri at a safe house in Kabul. American officials had been aware of a network supporting the terrorist leader in the Afghan capital for months, and had identified his wife, daughter and her children through multiple streams of intelligence.” This is intelligence done well — patiently building data points, seeking confirmation and establishing strong evidence that the target is who you think he is and where you think he is. CNN further reported, citing an administration official, that “as the months wore on, U.S. officials began to establish patterns at the house — including Zawahiri emerging periodically onto the home’s balcony for sustained periods of time.”
Intelligence analysts would have needed to know not just where Zawahiri was, but also the patterns of life of any other non-combatant members of his household. To find the house in the first place, they would have needed human or technical sources — or both — to establish the location and the identity of the persons inside.
This patient intel collection is extremely difficult without an embassy or military presence giving a footprint in country.
The Washington Post reported that Zawahiri’s house was in a secure section of an upscale neighborhood of Kabul, “behind a large bank and several guarded alleys lined with government compounds.” That’s a difficult target to penetrate. Despite these difficulties, as they so often do, the U.S. intelligence community found a way.
However, we should be careful not to extrapolate this success to either all of Afghanistan or to the entire counter terrorism fight. This was Kabul, where the U.S. is likely to have the most robust intelligence collection in Afghanistan, and where U.S. allies and well-established networks endure, although at a dramatically reduced level of visibility. Moving around the city can be dangerous, but still much safer than ranging far out into the mountains. This target was also the famous and recognizable leader of al-Qaida — his arrival in Kabul would have been big news, hard to keep secret no matter how good his operational security was. And while we may underestimate al-Qaeda at our peril, aggressive and dangerous segments of the group are global, serving as a network rather than a centralized power structure. A decapitation strike sets the group back, but does not end the threat.
Commentators and government officials alike are jumping to say this is proof that the over the horizon strategy is a success. It is not. The problem with a categorical statement either way is that success means proving a negative — it requires the absence of terrorist attacks to demonstrate its effectiveness. Even measuring success by ongoing strikes is problematic since that tool, while highly lethal, is not always the best approach, if civilians are present or the target’s operational security is highly effective. In other words, we may find the target, but the certainty may be too low and the risks may be too great to act from afar.
The intelligence community will always faithfully adhere to the primary objective of protecting the U.S. from foreign threats. Just as that mission is apolitical, decisions on the level of resources to devote to the counter terrorism fight should not be a political one. Rather than declare success or seek a political win, we should acknowledge that intelligence missions are hard, they get harder if there is no U.S. presence in country, and they get harder still if our allies are also blind. We should view over the horizon as a risky approach to a difficult mission, and we should be humble enough to admit if the threat is too grave for a distanced approach, even as we sleep a little easier knowing al-Zawahiri no longer poses a threat.
Emily Harding is a senior fellow and deputy director of the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) International Security Program.