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The world is changing — why isn’t America’s approach to foreign policy?

FILE - Chinese President Xi Jinping, right, and Russian President Vladimir Putin talk to each other during their meeting in Beijing, Feb. 4, 2022.

Words and slogans matter. President Obama’s “pivot to Asia”; President Trump’s “do me a small favor”; and President Biden’s “pariah and war criminal” labels all created major problems. Two current slogans, unless stricken from the lexicon now, will prove as counterproductive or worse.

Since Russia’s 2014 attack on Ukraine, many have regarded East-West relations as having entered a “new cold war” or “Cold War 2.0.” The arguments superficially may seem self-evident, as Russia turned from potential partner to adversary. They are not. The principal reason is that none of the assumptions foundational to the old Cold War paradigm apply today.

That Cold War construct rested on containing and deterring the Soviet Union. The thinking was that military alliances, principally NATO, and nuclear weapons would deter future Soviet expansion and aggression. The double-edged phrase MAD, for mutual assured destruction, expressed the understanding that thermonuclear war would eviscerate society on both sides of the Iron Curtain, making it unwinnable. And the West assumed or hoped that nuclear deterrence could be extended to deter lower levels of conflict with the USSR. 

Further, both sides maintained ongoing dialogues and communications that produced substantial arms control agreements and treaties. This ensured that what Nikita Khrushchev called “peaceful coexistence” would persist. Crises such as the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962 were resolved short of war. And the West’s endurance combined with the irrationality of the Soviet political and economic systems resulted in its collapse, ending the Cold War.

None of these remains in place. Then, the Soviet Union was singularly a military superpower. China was a nascent, developing country, used as a lever to bring about detente between Washington and Moscow. Today, Russia is a military and energy superpower. China is both an economic and rising military superpower. And the two are hostile towards America and NATO.

Today, neither China nor Russia has been contained or deterred. China’s Belt and Road initiative, militarization of tiny islets in contiguous seas and military buildup continue. Russia’s annexation of South Ossetia in 2008 and its 2014 seizure of Crimea were unopposed until this past Feb. 24, when Moscow invaded Ukraine.

Unfortunately, using the term “Cold War 2.0” reinforces the logic that today’s confrontations with Russia and China must be met and countered largely through military means. That may or not be the case. It is insufficient, and it neglects the stunning absence of bilateral communications. Unlike the Cold War, the U.S. and NATO are not engaged in regular dialogue or discussion with Russia today to alleviate any military confrontation, nor with China.

Beginning with the Obama administration, the U.S. embraced “great power competition” with China and Russia as its strategic framework. But “great power competition,” like “Cold War 2.0,” is a substantively diaphanous concept. Competition requires rules if it is to occur on a level playing field. There are none.

Over what are the U.S., China and Russia competing as opposed to contesting? Adequate definitions of competition are also missing. Regarding a military competition, what safeguards are in place to prevent the rivalries that erupted into World War I from reoccurring? None.

Distorting the dimensions of great power competition is the importance President Biden attaches to the conflict between “democracy and autocracy.” This is both an unhelpful and false dichotomy as Biden’s trip to Saudi Arabia made clear. Democracy must demonstrate that it works. Yet, the U.S., UK, French and Italian governments show signs of failing while Russia’s and China’s seem more stable. 

“Cold War 2.0” and “great power competition” should be replaced by the more accurate description of “dangerous coexistence.” Ensuring that some form of coexistence in these dangerous times can be preserved must be in the interests of all, given the many areas of conflict that could collide or explode into crises. And there are even greater, possibly existential, threats.

Elsewhere, the tectonic change in international politics has been characterized as the transition from the old to the “new MAD” of Massive Attacks of Disruption. Disruptive attacks are caused by man, from the invasion of Ukraine to Jan. 6 insurgencies, and by nature through natural disasters and pandemics. These and other disruptors are potentially existential. And the world is dangerously unprepared for the new MAD. 

“Dangerous coexistence” must replace “Cold War 2.0” and “great power competition” in our thinking. And within this new paradigm, containing and preventing the new MAD should become foundational. The sooner these necessities are fully understood, the sooner we will become safer, more secure and more prosperous.

Harlan Ullman is senior adviser at the Atlantic Council and the prime author of “shock and awe.” His latest  book is “The Fifth Horseman and the New MAD: How Massive Attacks of Disruption Became the Looming Existential Danger to a Divided Nation and the World at Large.” Follow him on Twitter @harlankullman.