This is not the time to abandon North Korean denuclearization

The recent spate of North Korean missile tests has resurrected the “denuclearization vs arms control” debate.

Eleven United Nations resolutions require Pyongyang to denuclearize by abandoning its nuclear and missile programs in their entirety. Arms control advocates deride this as an unrealistic policy goal and call, instead, for freezing North Korea’s nuclear and missile threats. But they have yet to provide a convincing argument that an arms control approach would be any more successful at curbing the North Korean threat — or even induce Pyongyang to resume negotiations, for that matter. The regime has rejected all U.S. and South Korean entreaties for dialogue for several years.

Arms control proponents have mischaracterized denuclearization as requiring North Korea to rapidly abandon the entirety of its nuclear and missile programs before receiving any benefits. But denuclearization proposals, including previous agreements with Pyongyang, call for incremental implementation over a period of years based on reciprocal actions by all parties. In this, they follow the path of arms control treaty negotiations with the Soviet Union.

Nor is the “new” arms control approach all that new. The “limit and freeze” approach did not work when North Korea signed the Nonproliferation Treaty (1985), International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards (1992), the inter-Korean nuclear agreement (1992) and the Agreed Framework (1994). North Korea violated each of those agreements, then failed to abide by its commitment in subsequent denuclearization accords.

North Korean dictator Kim Jong-un’s denuclearization vow in the 2018 Singapore summit statement was also a sham. Having repeatedly broken its word, why should we believe Pyongyang would honor its signature on an arms control agreement?

Abandoning denuclearization as a policy objective would have significant repercussions. If the U.S. forsook denuclearization, it would undermine the 11 UN resolutions requiring North Korea to abandon its weapons of mass destruction programs in a complete, verifiable, irreversible manner.

Such a policy shift would also remove the legal authority for Washington and other nations to impose and enforce sanctions for Pyongyang’s violations of international agreements. How could the U.S. negotiate “partial sanctions relief” for constraints on North Korean nuclear and missile programs if they no longer violated UN resolutions?

Formally renouncing denuclearization would contradict the Non-Proliferation Treaty and decades of U.S. non-proliferation policy. It would send a dangerous signal to other nuclear weapons aspirants that they can violate agreements and outlast international resolve to uphold them.

Legitimizing North Korea’s nuclear and missile arsenals could exacerbate South Korean and Japanese concerns about the viability of the U.S. commitment to their defense. They might worry that Washington would only seek to limit Pyongyang’s production of ICBMs capable of hitting the American homeland while allowing Pyongyang to retain hundreds of nuclear-capable short- and medium-range missiles. These concerns could increase advocacy within South Korea for an indigenous nuclear weapons program and greater reliance on preemption strategies.

Arms control advocates hope that, by renouncing denuclearization, the U.S. could coax Pyongyang to resume talking. There is no reason to believe such a major unilateral concession would spark any reciprocal diplomatic, security or military response.

Over the years, the United States and the international community provided North Korea with security guarantees, the curtailment of military exercises and a reduction of allied deterrence, large-scale economic benefits and humanitarian assistance. They have also overlooked human rights abuses, violations of UN resolutions and U.S. laws. They have even reduced sanctions ― all to no avail. Pyongyang continued to build its nuclear and missile forces.

An effective arms control treaty would require, as was included in nuclear, chemical and conventional force agreements with the Soviet Union, a comprehensive verification protocol of data declaration, monitoring and on-site inspections, including short-notice challenge inspections of non-declared facilities. Pyongyang has resisted or rejected such provisions during Six Party Talks and subsequent diplomatic engagements. 

I remain a strong advocate for continued diplomatic outreach to North Korea in order to lay the foundation for negotiations on North Korea’s nuclear and missile forces, as well as tension reduction and confidence-building measures. I favor a comprehensive agreement that retains denuclearization as a stated goal that would be implemented in incremental steps over a lengthy period of time. Others instead favor a series of smaller agreements, each of which hopefully leads to subsequent accords, though abandoning the goal of ever reaching the denuclearization goal line.

As we continue to debate the best path forward, the biggest impediment remains North Korea’s refusal to talk and unwillingness to abide by previous commitments. We should be forward leaning in calling for dialogue and negotiations with North Korean officials, but reticent to offer concessions just to get them into the room.

The United States and its allies must also protect their national security by augmenting and improving their deterrence and defense capabilities.

Bruce Klingner, a former CIA deputy division chief for Korea, is a senior research fellow in The Heritage Foundation’s Asian Studies Center.