Germany must overcome its reluctance to send heavy armor to Ukraine

Earlier this week, the German Federal Government issued its latest weekly update on the country’s military support for Ukraine. The list is quite long and continues to grow. It includes tank transporter tractors, Iris-T SLM, Strela and Stinger air defense systems, multiple rocket launchers, Gepard self-propelled anti-aircraft guns, anti-tank mines and Panzerfaust 3 and Matador anti-tank weapons, and a host of other supplies. But there is a notable exception: tanks.  When it comes to providing Ukraine with even older versions of its highly capable Leopard tanks and Marder infantry fighting vehicles (IFV), Germany has been cautious to a fault. And indeed, it should be faulted.

It is no secret that Germany has been dragged into supporting the Ukrainian war effort with the greatest reluctance. Its initial announcement that it would provide 5,000 helmets to Kyiv even as Russia was massing its forces to attack Ukraine was met with hoots of derision. Germany’s defense minister, Christine Lambrecht, defended her country’s decision by arguing that sending arms to Ukraine would not help defuse tensions between Kyiv and Moscow. Washington and London did not see things the same way; they both were already sending military equipment to the beleaguered nation.

Not only has Germany not sent its heavy armor to Ukraine, it has prevented other NATO states from doing so. The furthest it has been prepared to go in this regard is to transfer tanks to NATO allies under the country’s “Ringtausch” equipment exchange program. The program allows for Western systems to be transferred to NATO allies that were formerly Warsaw Pact members and that continue to operate Soviet-era equipment; such equipment is then sent on to Ukraine. Thus, for example, in August, Germany and Slovakia signed a tank swap agreement. Accordingly, two weeks ago, the German tank manufacturer Rheinmetall announced that later this month it will begin to draw upon stocks in various NATO states to send Slovakia 15 Leopard 2A4 main battle tanks, together with ammunition and spare parts. In turn, Bratislava will transfer Soviet-made T-72 tanks to Ukraine. The entire effort is expected to be completed by the end of 2023.

Berlin’s decision to pursue such a convoluted process, which in any event might last longer than the war itself, is due to the concern of the government headed by Chancellor Olaf Scholz — a concern it shares with Washington — that the direct transfer of heavy armor to Ukraine might lead to a confrontation between NATO and Russia. Yet NATO’s eastern allies, who would be the most immediate targets for Russian retaliation against NATO, evince no such hesitation. Moreover, the European Parliament has urged Berlin to take the lead in providing Leopards to Ukraine; nevertheless, Germany has yet to respond to the Parliament’s proposal.

Germany, like the United States, is already providing lethal materiel to Ukraine — and not merely defensive equipment, either. It is difficult to argue that German multiple rocket launchers or the Gepards that are equipped with gun barrels, to give but two examples, are purely defensive systems. The German government argues that it would take time to train Ukrainians in the use of Leopards, in particular. Yet, as with M-1s, now would be the best time to begin training Kyiv’s forces. By the time the ground hardens early in the new year, the Ukrainian troops would be ready to exploit the advantage that the Leopard will give them.

Berlin’s excuses for not sending tanks and IFVs are simply that — excuses. The government’s policy is a result of Scholz’s Social Democratic Party’s traditional reluctance to support military activity. On the other hand, both the Liberals and the Greens, the SPD’s other partners in Germany’s governing coalition, both support the transfers of Leopards and Marders to Kyiv. Germany has been producing a Marder replacement — the Puma — for over a decade yet refuses to transfer Marders.

Germany has been slowly ramping up its materiel support to Kyiv. “Slowly” is not good enough, however. Ukraine needs tanks and infantry fighting vehicles now, not after the passage of many months. Even the equipment that Berlin has been prepared to transfer to Kyiv is reaching its destination in dribs and drabs. Yet there can be little doubt that Moscow is preparing for a counteroffensive early in 2023.

Germany has now allocated more funds to support Ukraine than all other NATO allies bar the U.S. and the U.K. But it needs to reconsider how quickly and for what systems those funds should be expended. Ukrainian forces continue to rack up successes on the battlefield, but those successes might be short-lived unless the NATO allies, and Germany in particular, accelerate their military support for Kyiv and finally agree to help meet Ukraine’s increasingly urgent need for modern tanks and fighting vehicles to ensure that it can retain and build upon the battlefield successes that it has achieved.

Dov S. Zakheim is a senior adviser at the Center for Strategic and International Studies and vice chairman of the board for the Foreign Policy Research Institute. He was under secretary of Defense (comptroller) and chief financial officer for the Department of Defense from 2001 to 2004 and a deputy under secretary of Defense from 1985 to 1987.