Military technology cooperation with key allies outweighs the risk of leaks to enemies

At last week’s so-called “AUKUS Defense Ministerial” meeting, Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin and his British and Australian counterparts, Ben Wallace and Richard Marles, stated that they expected to announce in early 2023 what would be “the optimal pathway” for Australia to acquire at least eight conventionally-armed, nuclear-powered submarines. Translated into plain English, the phrase connotes the impending decision as to whether, in accordance with the terms of the September 2021 AUKUS agreement, the submarines will be based on a British or American design. In any event, both countries will share their nuclear propulsion technology with Australia.

AUKUS is more than a plan to build a new Australian submarine fleet to replace the aging Collins class. It also calls for cooperation among the three countries on a broad array of technologies, including, but not limited to, advanced cyber, artificial intelligence and autonomy, quantum technologies, undersea capabilities, hypersonic and counter-hypersonic technology, electronic warfare. It is in this context that the question of expanding AUKUS to other states has arisen.

In particular, the AUKUS ministerial has spurred considerable discussion regarding expanding AUKUS to include Japan, creating a so-called “JAUKUS.” Marles, the Australian defense minister, made it clear where Canberra stands on the matter: “AUKUS is a capability and technology partnership, one which we hope will form part of a broader network Australia seeks to build, in which Japan is central.” The question, therefore, is not whether Japan would join the club of three but when; indeed, some observers argue that the sooner, the better.

Japan, a longstanding American treaty ally, has recently expanded its military cooperation with the other two AUKUS states and has continued to increase its defense spending. Tokyo and Canberra signed a reciprocal access agreement in January, which calls for joint military exercises and easier access for each country’s forces onto the territory of the other, and generally provides for greater and what has been termed “seamless” cooperation between the two militaries. In October, the two countries also signed an updated and strengthened version of their wide-ranging 2007 Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation.

Japan likewise has deepened its military ties with the United Kingdom, whose forces are increasingly active in East Asia, including the aircraft carrier Queen Elizabeth’s five-month deployment to the South China Sea, which was completed last month. In 2017, London and Tokyo issued a Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation that called for joint exercises, information exchanges, and mutual logistics support. In July 2022, the two countries announced they would join Italy to develop a sixth-generation fighter aircraft. This month, the UK and Japan will sign a reciprocal access agreement similar to the Japanese-Australian agreement — and it is noteworthy that China’s media outlets have been attacking the prospect of this agreement since early November.

Any Japanese involvement in AUKUS would focus on technology cooperation. While some Japanese politicians favor Tokyo’s acquiring a nuclear-powered submarine force, others are skeptical or strongly opposed. The Japanese public likewise remains allergic to nuclear propulsion for naval forces. Japan has a capable conventionally-powered submarine force that is well-suited for operations near the home islands and, given the latest development in air independent propulsion technology, would allow for longer-distance deployments as well. 

Yet, Japanese participation in any high-technology efforts with the three AUKUS states would probably require easing American restrictions on technology transfer. Indeed, such restrictions would prevent other states from participating fully in AUKUS should they wish to do so. These include Canada, France (which originally was to sell nuclear-powered submarines to Australia) and Sweden. The latter also likely would be involved in service life extension for Australia’s Collins class subs, which will have to operate until Australia commissions its nuclear-powered submarine fleet sometime in the 2030s.

America first tightened its restrictions on technology transfer in the 1980s, when it was clear that its technology secrets were leaking to the Soviet Union. Washington since has tightened its restrictions over the years, but these have not prevented serious and damaging leakage to China, Russia and other hostile states. Both the Biden administration and Congress should therefore reevaluate whether the benefits of technology cooperation with highly advanced and reliable states such as Japan and Canada outweighs any risks of additional leaks to America’s enemies.

It is clear that Washington no longer can plan to fight two major powers simultaneously without the support of key allies. Allowing for those allies to cooperate even more closely with the United States on technology development would not only enhance the military capability of all involved, but would bolster their joint deterrent against China in particular, and those hostile to the West in general.

Dov S. Zakheim is a senior adviser at the Center for Strategic and International Studies and vice chairman of the board for the Foreign Policy Research Institute. He was under secretary of Defense (comptroller) and chief financial officer for the Department of Defense from 2001 to 2004 and a deputy under secretary of Defense from 1985 to 1987.