One of the most unexpected developments in the war in Ukraine is the emergence of the “Fellas” and NAFO (North Atlantic Fella Organization) — an online community of pro-Ukraine activists most easily identifiable by their Shiba Inu portraits. An informal group of analysts, media personalities, national security experts and regular social media users, the collective shot to prominence through their aggressive and social media savvy campaign against Russia’s propaganda.
The emergence of NAFO was wholly organic, despite the Kremlin’s accusations to the contrary. According to Emma Salisbury, a doctoral candidate at Birkbeck College, University of London, “This organization just emerged from what has been a very in-depth, but very niche, part of the internet.”
It is the weaponization of meme culture and inside internet jokes against Russia, which had long dominated the information warfare space against the West — largely by the West’s absence and unwillingness to engage in the kind of tactics the Kremlin deploys with regularity.
The Fellas and NAFO have managed to achieve notable successes. They have temporarily bullied Russian diplomats off of Twitter, been exceedingly successful in raising awareness of and funding for the Ukrainian cause, regularly call out Russian propaganda and “useful idiots” online and more. The movement weaponized the Kremlin’s own words against it and even monetized those very words in support of Ukraine’s armed forces across several platforms, the most prominent of which is St. Javelin, which sells t-shirts, mugs and more emblazoned with (among other things) Mikhail Ulyanov’s — Moscow’s ambassador to international organizations in Vienna — infamous statement “You pronounced this nonsense. Not me.”
Calling out Russia’s propaganda is invaluable, helping to stymy the unchallenged spread of the Kremlin’s “firehose of falsehoods.” It also, undoubtedly, has a significant morale effect for Ukrainians writ large, demonstrating that parts of the Western world are behind both Ukraine’s civilians and Kyiv’s fighters. This is invaluable and can only be detrimental to Russia’s armed forces, even from the limited glimpses they may receive.
These successes, and countless others, are worthy of praise, but they must be put into perspective. There is an element, of course of performative politics. Getting a customized Shiba Inu is akin to putting a Ukrainian flag in one’s bio — useful for signaling support, but not functionally productive. The real yeoman’s work of NAFO is being done amongst the unnamed activists, open source intelligence researchers and others who are identifying the propaganda, interdicting Moscow’s efforts to spread its narrative and effectively pushing back on the Kremlin’s information warfare.
In this campaign, the West has largely won the information war against itself and it is important to recognize the limitations of the Fellas and NAFO as much as their successes.
The Fellas and NAFO have had a significant impact in the West and on Western social media channels. Their presence is inescapable on Twitter, and they represent an informal bulwark against the Kremlin’s lies and propaganda. While the movement is not restricted to the English language and has a significant presence across Europe, its reach is fundamentally limited — it, and the information war more broadly, have had less effect in India, China and the Global South. The efficacy of the NAFO narrative or the information war in penetrating Russia or influencing Russian public opinion is likely far less than the West assumes. This is not a weakness of inherent to NAFO itself but reflects broader systemic information control by Moscow, restrictions on the media and domestic propaganda.
NAFO and the Fellas alone cannot win the information war against Russia, nor should there be any expectations that they could. Rather, they should be seen as becoming part of a concerted information warfare campaign — another tool in the arsenal of the West’s effort to recapture the information space, but one that it should approach with caution.
It is important to state from the outset, that this movement is informal and ad hoc. It is not a governmental operation. While Washington, London, Kyiv and others may welcome its emergence, there is no centralized or coordinated plan. Indeed, if there was one, it would almost certainly lack the flexibility and responsiveness NAFO has shown. This means that its actions can’t be controlled or deployed at will. There is little reason to assume that other conflicts will generate the same level of response as the war in Ukraine. Here, NAFO was a visceral response to Russia’s propaganda and the moral clarity of Ukraine’s fight for survival and territorial integrity. For the West, the “truth” was on its side — Russia was clearly the aggressor (and had been for some time) and supporting Ukraine’s defense was the “right” course of action.
Would the same be said for a hypothetical Chinese invasion of Taiwan? Would NAFO and the Fellas have the same impact against Beijing’s “50 Cent Army” of state-backed internet trolls who would almost certainly be deployed in an enhanced fashion ahead of or during any potential conflict? Would we see the development of an Indo-Pacific Fellas Organization (IPFO)? How would NAFO fair against the online elements of Beijing’s “wolf warrior” diplomacy, evidence of which was seen in then Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi’s (D-Calif.) visit to Taiwan? Would a conflict over Taiwan engender the same intensity of response in Western Europe and the United States as much as did the first major continental land conflict since the end of the Second World War?
The Twitter battlefield, or its successor platform, is not the physical battlefield, yet competing there matters. NAFO’s success should inspire Western governments to become more adept and better at competing in this space. This does not mean that the White House should begin trolling the Kremlin — amusing as that could be, especially with the official Twitter account now in the hands of the former head of New Jersey’s snarky account. Rather, it means engaging in the information space more aggressively and in a smarter fashion.
The United Kingdom’s Defence Intelligence account is an example of engaging smartly and in a more forward-thinking fashion. By publishing intelligence on a regular basis, the account is undercutting Russian narratives with the “truth.” The “official” narratives will always have a tainted brand as they are, of course, official outlets. NAFO’s strength is inherent to its unofficial nature, the replication of which will be beyond Washington, London or Brussels.
Looking to the future of information warfare means drawing the right lessons from the current conflict, and from the successes of NAFO and the Fellas. This movement is to be applauded and welcome, but its efficacy against Russia does not mean that it will prove as effective in the future, or even be present for that matter.
Joshua C. Huminski is the director of the Mike Rogers Center for Intelligence & Global Affairs at the Center for the Study of the Presidency & Congress. There he co-chairs the center’s program on strategic competition, with a specific focus on Russia and the Euro-Atlantic. He is also a book reviewer for the Diplomatic Courier and a fellow at George Mason University’s National Security Institute. He can be found on Twitter at @joshuachuminski.