All the (Ukrainian) president’s men

Ukraine was always going to be a difficult country for Volodymyr Zelensky to govern in peacetime, and it was just that early on during his presidency. Competing forces were constantly at cross purposes to the anti-corruption platform he ran and won on in a “landslide” against incumbent Petro Poroshenko in 2019. Ukrainian oligarchs, long conditioned to graft and corruption, were unyielding to reform and controlled much of the country’s media.

Nor did the outlying regions of Ukraine help, either. The oblasts, Ukraine’s version of U.S. states or Canadian territories, long wary of centralized power in Kyiv dating from when Ukraine was a Soviet republic, were demanding decentralization of power. Plus, then as now, the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) was full of Russian “Fifth Column” traitors and quislings.  

The early returns on Zelensky were not good. Domestic polls showed his approval rating dropping below 50 percent in February 2020, with 39 percent of the country indicating they did not trust him. Even the former U.S. ambassador to Ukraine under Bill Clinton, Steven Pifer, issued a scathing review of Zelensky in an op-ed that essentially accused the Ukrainian president of becoming what he claimed he had run against.

War, paradoxically, made governing far easier for Zelensky and, in carpe diem mode, he seized the moment.

His domestic approval rating now stands at 90 percent and he is empowered in a way that he wasn’t previously to confront head on Ukraine’s pervasive culture of corruption. Vladimir Putin’s “special military operation,” ironically, enabled Zelensky to consolidate his power in Kyiv in a manner he was incapable of achieving prewar.

That consolidation continues full speed ahead, as evidenced by Tuesday’s latest cabinet firings and sacking of regional governors. While many cabinet ministers resigned of their “own volition,” the reality is that they were canned. Corruption or the slightest hint of impropriety was the common theme. Oleksiy Symonenko, a deputy prosecutor general, was terminated for merely borrowing an oligarch’s Mercedes to drive to Spain on vacation.

Even Kyrylo Tymoshenko, the well-known deputy head of the Presidential Office and one of Zelensky’s closest advisers, was not immune. He was sacked for using a Chevrolet Tahoe donated by General Motors to assist with the evacuation of Ukrainians from the war’s frontlines (an allegation he denies).

Two dismissals, not yet confirmed by Zelensky’s office (but previously denied by the Ukrainian Defense Ministry), purportedly involve two deputy ministers of infrastructure, Ivan Lukerya and Vasil Lozinskyi. According to the Kyiv Post, Lozinskyi was involved in a corruption scheme to “overprice food products for the army.” The National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine also alleges Lozinskyi received $400,000 in bribes.

Zelensky’s latest crackdown on Ukrainian corruption did not happen in a vacuum. Ukraine, existentially, is facing a Russian counteroffensive come spring and Kyiv is desirous of undertaking one of their own, either in the east or in Crimea, to help force, if not dictate, an end to Putin’s war. To achieve the latter, Ukraine urgently needs offensive weaponry including the highly effective German-built Leopard 2 battle tank. 

Ukraine’s announcement, in that light, appears timed and designed to reassure Berlin and Washington that Zelensky and his ministries are committed to fighting corruption on an ongoing basis, even if it embarrassingly involves one of his closest advisers. Zelensky, in return, was quickly rewarded. German Chancellor Olaf Scholz announced on Wednesday that Germany will send Ukraine 14 Leopard 2 tanks — and President Biden followed up by announcing the U.S. would transfer 31 M1 Abrams tanks.

Zelensky’s crackdown is not merely a matter of exigency. It follows a long line of calculated moves to consolidate his political control in Kyiv and as a means to create a path for Ukraine to become part of the European Union — and ideally, NATO. Zelensky initially foreshadowed these two mutually supporting end goals when he met with Biden at the White House last September and publicly reiterated Ukraine’s aspiration to join NATO. 

The Ukrainian president’s team of closest advisers likely understood early on in 2021 that, whether the Russian invasion occurred or not, the threat of an expanded war created an opening for Zelensky to begin aggressively combating corruption as a pathway to EU and NATO membership. By early November, it was increasingly clear that Russia posed an immediate threat and danger to Kyiv as Russian troops began to amass on Ukraine’s border.

Once the Russian threat was detected, all the Ukrainian president’s men (and women) seized the moment. Andriy Yermak, currently head of the Office of the President of Ukraine and arguably Zelensky’s closest adviser and friend, publicly signaled a watershed change in an article published on Nov. 8, 2021, by the Atlantic Council, declaring that the “de-oligarchization” of Ukraine was now Kyiv’s “top priority.” 

Ukraine’s trajectory had completely changed. Kyiv was aware that its future as an independent government meant fully aligning itself with the West — and that meant immediately and dynamically transforming Ukraine’s business, judicial and governing culture. Oligarchs no longer were going to be able to do business as usual. Judicial reform (by no means complete) also became imperative. 

It also meant taking on the SBU and the Prosecutor General’s office. Zelensky did just that in July 2022, firing Ivan Bakanov, head of the SBU, and Iryna Venediktova, Ukraine’s prosecutor general. Zelensky then began purging the SBU of Russian sympathizers and collaborators. Ukraine’s determination to rid the country of Russian spies even extended to purging the Russian Orthodox Church in Ukraine (and not without criticism in the West).

Zelensky’s efforts to reform Ukraine have come at a price. The Verkhovna Rada, Ukraine’s parliament, has significantly less power as Zelensky and the nation’s powerful top general, Valeriy Zaluzhnyy, the commander in chief of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, out of necessity make most of the key day-to-day decisions for the country. 

The challenge for Zelensky — and indeed, all of the Ukrainian president’s men — will be the same one that George Washington faced at the end of the Revolutionary War: to relinquish power when that time comes and allow democracy to fully take root and flourish. Or to become dictators. The latter is unlikely. 

Ukraine’s only independent future is indeed with the West and if Kyiv is to ascend to the EU and NATO (it deserves to be in both), then there is only one choice to be made. Zelensky likely will make the right one. After all, good entertainers, even comedians, know when it is time to exit the stage.

Mark Toth is a retired economist, historian and entrepreneur who has worked in banking, insurance, publishing, and global commerce. He is a former board member of the World Trade Center, St. Louis, and has lived in U.S. diplomatic and military communities around the world, including London, Tel Aviv, Augsburg, and Nagoya. Follow him on Twitter @MCTothSTL. 

Jonathan Sweet, a retired Army colonel, served 30 years as a military intelligence officer. His background includes tours of duty with the 101st Airborne Division and the Intelligence and Security Command. He led the U.S. European Command Intelligence Engagement Division from 2012-14, working with NATO partners in the Black Sea and Baltics. Follow him on Twitter @JESweet2022.