Beijing’s game of arsenals
The Center for Strategic and International Studies released an alarming report indicating the United States is not ready to fight China in Taiwan. According to the report, in the first week alone, the “U.S. would likely run out of some munitions — such as long-range precision guided munitions.” Now, as the war in Ukraine enters a second year, U.S. national security, more than ever, is coming down to a game of arsenals between Washington and the totalitarian regimes challenging the West for supremacy.
Secretary of State Antony Blinken correctly asserted that “China’s considering providing lethal support to Russia in its aggression against Ukraine.” The U.S. is lagging in this deadly game and China can create additional separation by providing lethal aid to Russia, cementing a “forever war” in Ukraine. China has what Russia needs — uniforms, weapons and ammunition, enough to outfit whatever number Russian President Vladimir Putin and his generals put into the Ukrainian meat grinder for the foreseeable future. Manpower is not an issue; neither is supply for China. They can also provide drones, artillery and munitions to satisfy the “Russian way of war.”
Since the beginning of the war in Ukraine, Beijing has warily watched Putin’s “special military operation” repeatedly fail and become bogged down into a war of attrition. Ever opportunistic, China until now has stayed in the shadows and capitalized on heavily discounted Russian energy imports. Chinese President Xi Jinping’s calculus, to date, has been fairly simple: reap the economic benefits, remain focused on Taiwan, and use the ongoing conflict to weaken the West without weakening China in the process.
It is important to understand that, despite public statements otherwise, Xi does not view Putin as an equal ally, but as a challenging, if not needy, partner. Not quite “Amicus meus, inimicus inimici mei” — more commonly known as “the enemy of my enemy is my friend” — but close. The U.S. is the common enemy. Putin falls under the adage, “With friends like these, who needs enemies?”
Now, Xi’s “frenemy” is in danger of losing and the Chinese president may be forced to recalculate China’s position. The game is changing and Xi is changing with it to position Beijing to reap short- and long-term gains. Until now, China has been content to let the Kremlin shop for their heavily depleted munitions in Iran and North Korea — Russia’s “Arsenals of evil” — and limit its own aid to non-lethal military assistance.
The possibility of Putin losing and the strategic check he creates on the U.S., however, may cause Xi to rethink his own arsenal strategy. Should Putin fail, the U.S. and its allies can militarily focus on deterring Xi’s designs on Taiwan. If Putin wins, Russia’s global standing would rise and, while largely at the expense of the U.S., it also would exact an economic price on China. Xi must weigh the Chinese economic costs of the war in Ukraine continuing versus the benefits of the conflict continuing to drain U.S. military stores.
The war in Ukraine is severely challenging the U.S. and NATO’s ability to keep up with Kyiv’s munition needs. Russia, it is estimated, fires “20,000 artillery rounds per day” while Ukraine fires “4,000 to 7,000.” In the words of one unnamed U.S. official, this combined burn rate has “not been seen since the Korean war.” The strain is becoming acute. NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg warned on Feb. 13 that “the current rate of Ukraine’s ammunition expenditure is many times higher than our current rate of production.”
Munition drain to meet Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky’s needs is one thing, but the war in Ukraine is also having a significant impact on U.S. and NATO military readiness. Some member-states have donated their entire inventories of artillery to Kyiv. Estonia provisioned all of its 155mm howitzers and more, and Denmark earmarked 19 French-made Caesar howitzer artillery systems to the front lines in Ukraine.
The starkness of this looming weaponry and munitions shortage confronting the U.S. and NATO was made all too clear when President Biden adopted a production-oriented approach to meeting new Ukrainian requirements versus an off-the-shelf approach. One example of this unfolding crunch is the 31 M1 Abrams Main Battle Tanks designated for Ukraine. Defense officials now acknowledge they may not be dispatched to Ukraine until 2025 given production line constraints.
Putin, accordingly, has no alternative but to go hat-in-hand to Xi to plead for Chinese weapons and munitions. Xi undoubtedly is tempted for a variety of reasons. It would strategically challenge the U.S. and could provide a boost to China’s sputtering economy. As a bonus, it would give Beijing an even bigger foothold in what long has been a U.S.-, French- and Russia-dominated arms market.
Moscow’s revenues from arms exports were down 26 percent in 2022. Presently, the U.S. is first in global arms exports, Russia second, France third and China fourth; however, if Beijing meets Putin’s needs, its growing military industrial complex would put pressure on both France and Russia — especially in the “low end of the arms market.”
For Xi, it comes down to opportunity costs and how he elects to play his cards as to when and where he opens his military arsenals. For now, he appears to be keeping his options open and has even added a diplomatic card. On Feb. 24, the Chinese Foreign Ministry released a 12-point position paper outlining how “peace can be restored in Ukraine.”
China’s peace outline could be read multiple ways. First, as an acknowledgement the war in Ukraine is hurting the global economy and, by extension, that of China — one of its key points is ending “unilateral sanctions” of the kind the U.S. is imposing on Moscow and Beijing. Second, simply as diplomatic smoke to cover Xi’s real intent, which could include going all-in, in terms of supplying lethal weapons to Putin. Or, merely as a way of trying to buy Putin time to retrieve his military position in Ukraine.
Regardless, neither Washington nor Kyiv is likely to bite. Even Putin, operating in frenemy mode, appears to have “snubbed” Beijing’s proposal given the Kremlin declared in response that there are “no conditions for peace at the moment in Ukraine.” This, despite an upcoming state visit by Xi to Moscow to discuss China’s peace plan.
The threat posed to the West by Xi is very real and potent. CIA Director William Burns is right to be concerned that Beijing is seriously considering equipping Russia with lethal weapons for use in Ukraine. But Xi’s game of arsenals is far bigger than simply the ongoing war between Moscow and Kyiv. It is, like a Risk board game, encompassing all of the map.
Xi, after all, fervently believes “the East is rising and the West is declining.” For his purposes, despite Putin’s protestations to the contrary, Xi considers Russia as being part of the West. The acrimony between the two countries, both communist, goes all the way back to the founding of the People’s Republic of China in 1949.
Beijing’s game of arsenals, however it plays out, is not about Putin winning or losing in Ukraine. It is about Xi winning — and, at the end of the day, Washington losing. If that is to be avoided, the U.S. must again without delay begin rebuilding its own arsenals of democracy. It is a game of arsenals and the U.S. is perilously behind.
Jonathan Sweet, a retired Army colonel, served 30 years as a military intelligence officer. His background includes tours of duty with the 101st Airborne Division and the Intelligence and Security Command. He led the U.S. European Command Intelligence Engagement Division from 2012-14, working with NATO partners in the Black Sea and Baltics. Follow him on Twitter @JESweet2022.
Mark Toth is a retired economist and entrepreneur who has worked in banking, insurance, publishing, and global commerce. He is a former board member of the World Trade Center, St. Louis, and has lived in U.S. diplomatic and military communities around the world, including London, Tel Aviv, Augsburg, and Nagoya. Follow him on Twitter @MCTothSTL.
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