As NATO welcomes Finland as the 31st member country of its alliance, Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko is feeling the pressure of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s failing “special military operation” in Ukraine, prompting him to request the deployment of tactical nuclear weapons to his country. Apparently, it is never too early for contingency planning and Lukashenko is looking for assurances from Putin — though that must have been an awkward conversation.
Possession of nuclear weapons has become a security blanket for some authoritarian leaders. For others, it serves more as a “get out of jail free” card. The potential for nuclear escalation affords them some degree of leverage. Putin has used his nuclear escalation leverage to keep NATO from providing direct support to Ukraine; denied and delayed the deployment of specific “offensive” weapon systems into the battle space; and attempted to dictate from where Ukraine can conduct its counteroffensive — and it has been mostly successful. China, North Korea, Iran and now Belarus have taken notice. Lukashenko likely hopes the presence of tactical nuclear weapons in Belarus will prevent a reprisal attack from Ukraine, but he appears to be more fearful of Poland, when Russian support is no longer a viable option. With a tactical nuclear weapon capability, he likely could hold off any external reprisals, but not indefinitely.
Nuclear capability has a way of doing that, a reality recently articulated during an interview with Irish Raidió Teilifís Éireann (RTÉ) on April 4, in which former President Bill Clinton said he regretted “persuading Ukraine to give up its nuclear weapons” in the 1990s, suggesting Russia would not have invaded Ukraine if Kyiv still had nuclear weapons. He went on to say, “I feel a personal stake because I got them [Ukraine] to agree to give up their nuclear weapons. And none of them believe that Russia would have pulled this stunt if Ukraine still had their weapons.”
Lukashenko should be concerned; the war is not going as planned. The Belarusian president has provided Putin and his army sanctuary in his country throughout the war — allowing Russian forces to stage from within their borders and then launch a ground invasion into Ukraine to secure the capital city of Kyiv; permitting ballistic missiles to be fired into Ukraine from Belarus; and currently allowing Russian soldiers to train in his country prior to their deployment to the front lines. Lukashenko’s military has provided weapons and medical assistance to Russia as well. He has been an avid supporter of Putin, and short of putting boots on the ground in Ukraine, he has supported the Kremlin’s war effort in every manner possible.
He has even threatened direct support to Russia if Ukraine were to respond to Belarusian aggression, stating, “I am ready to fight together with the Russians from the territory of Belarus only in one case: if at least one soldier sets foot in Belarus to kill my people.” But now that a Ukrainian counteroffensive is pretty much assured, his security blanket is about to be yanked out from under his feet as the very real possibility exists that Russian ground forces will be defeated and expelled from Ukraine. The chicken has come home to roost.
Lukashenko probably feels exposed and vulnerable, which prompted a meeting with Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu in Minsk on April 10 to request security guarantees if his country were attacked. If the counteroffensive is successful and Russia is defeated in Ukraine, the Kremlin would have bigger problems than Belarus and no longer could provide top cover for the tough-talking Belarusian president.
Lukashenko does not appear to have much confidence in his own military either — and for good reason. The Belarusian military was ranked 60th out of 145 countries in the 2023 Global Firepower database. A more pressing concern is whether the Belarusian military, or the country, would support Lukashenko. The Washington Post reported in September 2022 that a majority of Belarusians “did not want their country to take part in the war against Ukraine.” They went on to cite a Chatham House poll conducted in August 2022, which revealed only “5 percent of Belarusians favored sending troops to support Russia, while 2 percent wanted Belarus to side with Ukraine. About 70 percent of Belarusians indicated their refusal to engage in the conflict.”
So, Lukashenko is seen as a Kremlin puppet, and in March 2022 he had an approval rating of 25 percent, a reality that Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya and her exiled government in Lithuania exploit as much as they can.
The bigger question, though, is what does Moscow get in return for storing tactical nuclear weapons in Belarus? Moscow is not likely to give something for nothing in return, especially considering the possibility of regime change if they fail in Ukraine. Therefore, in this contingency quid pro quo, Belarus could be a landing point for Putin and his entourage, should they be removed from power — the asylum option.
It also would provide an escape from the International Criminal Court (ICC), as long as Lukashenko remains in power. The ICC issued an arrest warrant for Putin in March, accusing him of war crimes, saying he “bore criminal responsibility for the abduction and deportation of Ukrainian children.” Belarus is not a state party to the ICC. For what it’s worth, “The ICC has jurisdiction over Rome Statute crimes that take place — at least in part — on the territory of its neighbors: Lithuania, Latvia, Poland and Ukraine.”
Belarus and Russia still maintain a joint military group in Belarus, defending against an alleged terrorist threat from Ukraine and the West. In October 2022, the estimated strength of the joint military group was 60,000 Belarusian troops, and upwards to 10,000 to 15,000 Russian troops. Together with tactical nuclear weapons, and the aircraft and missile systems required to deliver them, the pieces on the chess board may be in place for a regime change in Russia. It’s a reality Lukashenko will have to embrace soon, as Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and his generals prepare to launch their counteroffensive.
Jonathan Sweet, a retired Army colonel, served 30 years as a military intelligence officer. His background includes tours of duty with the 101st Airborne Division and the Intelligence and Security Command. He led the U.S. European Command Intelligence Engagement Division from 2012-14, working with NATO partners in the Black Sea and Baltics. Follow him on Twitter @JESweet2022.
Mark Toth is a retired economist and entrepreneur who has worked in banking, insurance, publishing, and global commerce. He is a former board member of the World Trade Center, St. Louis, and has lived in U.S. diplomatic and military communities around the world, including London, Tel Aviv, Augsburg, and Nagoya. Follow him on Twitter @MCTothSTL.