On June 21, North Korea monitoring group 38 North published a report on the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) making infrastructure improvements at its Yongbyon nuclear research facility. Satellite images in the report show modifications to the site’s plutonium reactor and the construction of several support facilities. The North also has built an engineering office on site. These facility upgrades appear to have been in the making before the U.S.-DPRK summit.
As we know, the main intent of the June 12 summit in Singapore between President Trump and North Korean leader Kim Jong Un was for the president to fasten North Korea to a commitment to denuclearization. The summit produced a watered-down joint statement, which made a brief mention of North Korea’s commitment to “complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.” President Trump, without having secured from Kim an explicit guarantee to denuclearize, declared North Korea no longer posed a nuclear threat. And just last week, he said Kim Jong Un agreed to begin “total denuclearization” right away. We also have recently heard that the United States no longer will set a timetable for the North’s denuclearization.
{mosads}Across the Pacific, South Korea recently held a meeting with North Korean counterparts to discuss the inter-Korean railway cooperation. If plans pan out, the cross-border railway will give the Kim regime access to China and parts of Eastern Europe — a gateway to economic opportunities beyond the peninsula.
Additionally, Washington and Seoul indefinitely suspended their annual joint military exercises as a concession to Pyongyang. They were, according to President Trump, costly and “provocative.”
North Korea, for its part, is expected to return the remains of a sizable number of U.S. troops missing after the Korean War. This was one of the four main agreement points in the Singapore joint statement — and an easy box for Pyongyang to check off. President Trump said the DPRK already has returned the remains to the United States, but we have yet to confirm whether Pyongyang has done so. And one week after the Singapore summit, Kim went to Beijing to meet with Xi Jinping to debrief the Chinese leader and strategize a path forward. Let’s not forget here that President Trump told the press he gave Kim his direct phone number — as far as we know, Kim has not called the President.
So what can we glean from all of this?
At this point, it should not come as a surprise that North Korea is proceeding “business-as-usual” with its nuclear research and development. For one, the joint statement signed in Singapore was so vaguely worded in reference to Pyongyang’s denuclearization, it left a gaping hole in the next steps to securing any kind of follow-on action steps on North Korea’s part. More importantly, the question of the DPRK’s fundamental, existential justification for possessing a nuclear program has not changed — nor will it. The Kim regime’s identity and most potent card is its nuclear weapons program; it is in the regime’s interest of survivability to retain its nuclear capability.
Likely, North Korea will continue to pursue “research and development” of its nuclear program, seek to extract as many economic benefits and political or stature-enhancing opportunities through Washington, Seoul and any other interested parties, and play the United States against China through these occasional bond-enhancing exchanges with Xi that are sure to make Washington uneasy. If anything, our response to and follow-on measures, post-Singapore, probably emboldened Kim and showed just how much leeway he had with what might have been perceived as North Korea’s toughest adversary. Our waffling, leniency and openness will only whet Pyongyang’s appetite for extortion and manipulation all the more.
But that’s not to say that we are on an inevitably downward spiraling path. There is still time for the United States, South Korea, Japan and the international community to prevent further damage to our stature and credibility. For one, Washington can still call out Pyongyang for not holding up its end of the deal through sanctions and other levers to reduce the incentive for the DPRK to retain its nuclear program. The summit was a big win for Kim, and to this day, he is still enjoying his victory lap.
Seoul, for its part, can refrain from cultural and economic exchanges with Pyongyang until we have seen the Kim regime on a clear, consistent, and progressive path toward reformed behavior. Reopening the Kaesong Industrial Complex, exploring options to open the cross-border railway, education exchanges between South and North Korean universities, real estate investment prospects — all positive development opportunities, but too premature in light of the DPRK’s dilatory approach.
The international community should collectively express disapproval of Pyongyang’s behavior — and the vehicles and voices for doing so are endless possibilities. Critical point: all parties need to work together, coordinate, and be in unison in our stance against North Korea’s nuclear and missile provocations, human rights violations, and other illicit activities.
We have yet to firmly put our foot down and push back against Kim. The concessions thus far, however small or trivial, add up to embolden the regime and squeeze our ability to respond, prevent and preempt in an effective manner. Not to mention, it erodes our credibility.
Soo Kim is a former CIA North Korea analyst, focusing on the regime’s leadership, nuclear proliferation and propaganda analysis. She was a 2015 National Security Fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, where she authored a monograph on the South Korean nuclear program. Follow her on Twitter @mllesookim.