Over time, things wear out. Cars, cell phones, hips, knees and other low joints often need replacement. That process applies to words too.
For about seven decades, a common American strategic lexicon has persisted. Containment, a product of the early Cold War, deterrence and its cousin MAD for mutual assured destruction, defense, and the whole family of proliferation — including non-, counter- and anti- — were central to this strategic dictionary. But are they still relevant?
Containment was meant to keep the Soviet Union from expanding west beyond its borders and those of its satellite states comprising the Warsaw Pact. Deterrence and MAD were designed to prevent an existential thermonuclear World War III between East and West. And the proliferation family was to limit the spread of weapons of mass destruction. All reflected this bipolar conflict.
Much of that world is gone or has undergone a tectonic change. The U.S. now confronts two main challengers. China is an economic and an emerging military superpower. Russia is an energy and nuclear weapons superpower that has started a war on NATO’s borders.
But containment has not worked. China is threatening Taiwan and is encroaching on its neighbors’ access to international waters. It is expanding its global military presence. And paramount leader Xi Jinping is attempting to become a key global influencer, perhaps replacing the U.S. And, of course, Russia seized parts of Georgia in 2008 and Crimea in 2014, and it attacked Ukraine last year.
While some might assert that deterrence has avoided nuclear war and Taiwan has not been invaded by China, that is a paper-thin argument. Likewise, nine states possess nuclear weapons, and several more have a short-term breakout potential. What do these realities mean for the strategic lexicon?
First, the old MAD has been replaced by a new MADD for massive attacks of disruption and destruction, by both man and nature. On the latter, the COVID-19 pandemic and climate change have caused more deaths and destruction than many wars. National security must embrace these threats and dangers as much as those posed by traditional state and non-state actors.
Second, deterrence has become what I refer to as “triterrence.” During the Cold War, the analogy of two scorpions in a bottle was employed. Today, metaphorically, there are three scorpions, with others seeking entry. The consequences are profound. Nuclear targeting is one example. Where do, and will, these scorpions target their weapons? And what about the conventional aspects when technology is offering extraordinary capabilities?
Third, operationally, containment needs a replacement. Using MADD, which combines the existential threat of thermonuclear war and the existential dangers posed by nature — irrespective of one’s view of climate change — as the foundations for national security also will modernize the strategic lexicon. The aim of MADD must be to prevent and contain damage to take the place of deterrence and defense.
Prevention and containment of damage assume more active and even proactive policies than traditional deterrence, which, of course, was never designed to deal with the non-state aspects of MADD. This applies to triterrence. Maintaining some balance between and among these three principal powers is essential. And that raises another Cold War term of arms control.
Arms control was crucial during the Cold War in reducing not only weapons but also tensions and the dangers of war by miscalculation. The New START Treaty limits the U.S. and Russia to 1,550 warheads. China is now increasing its nuclear forces to at least several hundred or more warheads and does not intend to engage in arms control. How will this play out under a number of scenarios, including a semi-alliance between Moscow and Beijing or a breakdown of that relationship?
As the Cold War hardened, massive intellectual effort went into strategic analysis and the formation of concepts for the thermonuclear age. It is unclear that a similar level of intellectual resources is present today. The tendency seems to be a linear progression using these dated terms and concepts.
Given the intense politicization and divisions in America today, the question is whether “objective” analyses are possible. Further, when is the last time any administration made a profound alteration in its national security policy and planning? Since the Obama administration’s national security and defense strategies (NSS and NDS), the Trump and Biden White Houses have followed suit. The aims are similar to contain and deter, and if war comes, deter or prevail over five potential adversaries topped by China and Russia.
Will this thinking change? The answer is probably not. And that will not necessarily provide for an adequate, future common defense.
Harlan Ullman, Ph.D. is a senior advisor at Washington, D.C.’s Atlantic Council and the prime author of “shock and awe.” His twelfth book, “The Fifth Horseman and the New MAD: How Massive Attacks of Disruption Became the Looming Existential Danger to a Divided Nation and the World at Large,” is available on Amazon. He can be reached on Twitter @harlankullman.