What the stolen SeaTac Airport plane really says about aviation security

Recently, a ground service agent managed to gain access to a parked Horizon Air Q400 aircraft and take off from the SeaTac International Airport for an hour-long joy ride. The short-lived flight ended in a fiery crash on nearby island, killing the man who stole the plane. No one else was onboard.

Without the death involved, this incident would have been laughed off as a wacky “do-you-believe” it story. Instead, this unusual incident prompted understandable — but unfounded — security concerns. We must not turn this incident into a media blitz of hyperbolic rhetoric on the dangers in aviation. Let’s calm down and see what we’re dealing with.

{mosads}The first observation is that this person was no drunken frat boy on a delusional prank. He was no dummy. He knew how to (1) fire up the Q400 aircraft engines, (2) he was familiar with standard SeaTac airport procedures and radio frequencies, (3) he could operate the aircraft along the airport taxiways, (4) he knew how to configure the airplane for takeoff, and (5) he appears to have been a competent pilot. He was also a fully credentialed long-time employee authorized to be in and around the aircraft and the ramp. A person with such a background, augmented by his native intelligence and aviation knowledge, is almost impossible to stop without applying extreme security measures that are not usually associated with civil aviation.

Still, everyone asks the question, “How can a person, even a highly knowledgeable person, takeoff without air traffic control (ATC) authorization?” No problem. All airports have periods of low activity during which other traffic is unlikely to interfere with this planned act. The man who stole this plane simply needed to start the aircraft’s engines, and not contact ground control to request permission to taxi, taxies to the runway, and takes off.

The airport ATC tower is not an armed military defense facility. It is a civilian service facility established to ensure the safe and efficient movement of aircraft on and within a five mile radius of the airport. The tower is not equipped with laser death rays or anti-aircraft rockets that can be used to prevent unauthorized operations. Tower controllers can only direct the pilot over the tower radio frequency to halt his actions and, if appropriate, file a violation against his pilot’s license (if he has one). Not much of a deterrent.

So what might we do? Some have suggested increased mental health evaluations and treatment. However, considering the SeaTac incident, except for a few clearly suicidal references, the pilot sounded like an articulate, intelligent, confident, and “normal” person who would not raise serious mental stability concerns from co-workers or management. But, enough about that because the mental health argument is the same old red herring we hear about in the gun control “debate.” Mental health “solutions” would no doubt be as effective in preventing unauthorized aircraft operations as they are in preventing the unauthorized slaughter of innocent people.

Some have offered another suggestion: “What about physical obstacles at the edge of the Movement Area that controllers can retract when granting authority for pilots to enter?” This is a bad idea. This would be an operational nightmare during high traffic conditions and an overwhelming financial burden on airport funding to “fix” something that is likely to never happen again.

Controllers in the tower maintain a close vigil over their assigned segments of the Movement Area and know almost immediately when an unauthorized penetration occurs. A more reasonable financial approach (while operationally problematic) would be for the airport to maintain several vehicles on constant alert for a tower declaration of a Movement Area Violation. When such an incident occurs, the vehicles would rush to surround the violating aircraft to block any further movement. Of course, if the aircraft is large or a turboprop like the Q400 that has two violently rotating engine propeller blades right in front of the two main landing gears, the drivers of the vehicles would have to be at least as suicidal as the offending pilot. (Excuse my aviation sarcasm.)

In reality, the only response that is operationally feasible and financially responsible is to simply (1) upgrade the depth of the background checks used to clear pre-hire personnel for necessary credentials, and (2) increase the training of all employees on the need for constant vigilance and reporting of potential safety breakdowns regarding threats to aircraft and passengers. This is certainly not the bold exciting response that people shocked by the SeaTac incident want to hear, but at least it’s more focused and relevant than a symbolic, meaningless grand gesture.

Stephen M. Alvania is a former FAA air traffic controller and a 48 year veteran of the aviation industry with a special focus on ATC procedures and the development of new ATC automation capabilities.