A ceasefire in Ukraine would reward Moscow and undermine Western interests

As Russia’s aggression continues, some of those Western observers who sought to minimize its initial impact on world affairs or who expected a Russian victory now argue that Washington should generate an endgame strategy that, in effect, saves Moscow from the cost of its own folly.

 Numerous opinions tell us that this war cannot be won, that it will be a war of attrition for years, that it could inevitably lead to a nuclear escalation etc. Therefore Washington (and presumably, Europe) should intervene to impose a ceasefire leaving Moscow in control of at least some of its ill-gotten aims. 

Unfortunately, these are the same tired arguments we heard last year which were disproved by the course of the fighting. They hold out no prospect of continuing Western support for Ukraine, or for a Ukrainian victory on the field. The purveyors of this line also look askance at Ukrainian membership in NATO, which would assuredly deter any future Russian attacks and in the name of peace, by saying it would justify Russia’s conquests, ensuring no peace for years to come.  

It is long since time Washington and its allies realize that some sort of agreement with Russia on European peace and security is not in the cards. Instead, as Keir Giles’ work brilliantly shows, Russia has been and remains at war with the West of its own volition and due to its own intrinsic political-cultural structure. The longstanding tendency to privilege Russian security concerns over those of its neighbors in Western policy has clearly led policymakers to a dead end. It cannot be invoked anymore as a rationale for policy, U.S. allied interests or European security. 

It is no less clear that only Ukraine’s inclusion in NATO and Western arms transfers and political action can bring about a Ukrainian victory. Indeed, U. S. Intelligence Chief Avril Haines now believes that Russia cannot launch any new offensives. So while a Russian victory may no longer be feasible, a Ukrainian victory, admittedly, based on large-scale support, is possible. But that support is necessary for the U.S. and its allies’ interests precisely because Moscow is at war with the entire West, Ukraine being the epicenter and sole kinetic theater. 

It, therefore, is worth asking why so many observers deem it necessary to save Russia from the consequences of its crimes at the expense of our allies and our own interests and values. Perhaps they are blinded by the claims Russia makes for its power and, in particular, its nuclear arsenal. Certainly, one intention of that arsenal is to impress upon onlookers the power and reach of Russian power. But that power, while more than sufficient to deter what would be a suicidal invasion of Russia, has proven to be less than useful when it comes to defeating Ukraine. 

Whatever the source of the intellectual fascination with propitiating Russian power may be, it cannot function as an ongoing justification for Russian aggression and war crimes. Indeed, yielding to the fixation on Russia means rescuing it from the just punishment of its crimes and follies, in this instance, at the expense of international law, order and U.S. interests and values. Moreover, the argument that this war cannot be won and that the only future open to U.S. policy is to perpetuate Russia’s imperial drive by trying to impose a ceasefire amounts to a confession of failure on Washington’s part. 

It must be realized that this war, for all of its tragedy, allows us to build what President Nixon called “a structure of peace” in Europe, if not elsewhere. Such a structure will rectify the failure of 1991 by including Ukraine in the European Union where it wants and needs to be and simultaneously foreclosing the renewal of Russia’s imperial project, which is attainable only through permanent war or Cold War, and not only in Europe.  

The idea that this war cannot be won or can only end by a negotiation giving Moscow something it can claim as a victory represents a failure of both the will and the imagination. Apart from its moral failings, this view fails the acid test of Realpolitik because it betrays the national interests not only of Ukraine but also of Washington and its allies.  

Unstinting support for Ukraine can bring not just victory but also a new and more durable European security order based on something more than the need to propitiate a Moscow that, in any case, cannot and will not be appeased. 

Stephen Blank, Ph.D., is a senior fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI). He is a former professor of Russian national security studies and national security affairs at the Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College and a former MacArthur fellow at the U.S. Army War College. Blank is an independent consultant focused on the geopolitics and geostrategy of the former Soviet Union, Russia and Eurasia.