A cottage industry of institutions seeking “lessons learned” from the Ukrainian war is reaching industrial strength. Drones, Starlink satellites, hypersonic missiles and citizens supplying targeting information to Ukrainian artillery units are among the “new” faces of war that are capturing headlines and attention.
But be careful. The use of the word “lessons” can be very misleading.
So-called lessons drawn from the war in Ukraine may not have universal application except in general terms. Courage, competence, commitment and creativity, for example, have enabled Ukraine to repel the Russian invasion and at least make tactical advances. Yet, each is as old as war.
First, the siren-like call to allow tactical and operational lessons to become surrogates for drawing broader geostrategic and geopolitical conclusions is always present.
Strategies based on these narrower tactical military lessons invariably fail. To succeed, strategies must be much broader than simply encompassing the military domain.
U.S. strategy in Vietnam, Iraq (twice) and Afghanistan was, in fact, the application of military strategies as substitutes that would not work. Russia’s strategy for Ukraine was a miscast military strategy. Capture Kyiv quickly and Ukraine would surrender.
Second, many analysts, myself included, drawing on history concluded that “sneak attacks” always tactically succeeded. The Nazi invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941, Pearl Harbor in December of that year and North Korea’s invasion of the south in June 1950 were tactical successes that did not end well for the aggressor. The Middle East Wars often began with successful tactical sneak attacks, most famously Israel in June 1967 and Egypt and Syria in October 1973. The Israelis won both. However, Russia’s failed sneak attack gives reason to review this history.
Third, how states learn from wars is critical. Often that does not happen. Preparation for war was something the Ukrainians exploited.
After Crimea was taken in 2014, a true revolution in military affairs unfolded in Ukraine. From reorganization to imaginative and innovative uses of technology, Ukraine imposed major reforms. One reason was that Ukraine faced a real existential threat that was manifested in 2022 with Russia’s second invasion. Even though thermonuclear war was a threat then and is a threat now, the U.S. and NATO never lost any territory to the Soviet Union and Russia — a fundamental difference from Ukraine’s history.
While the U.S. was able to make major changes in both military strategy and force structure during the Cold War, what is America doing now as it confronts Russia and China and the “no limits” alliance? Regarding China, has the U.S. really moved to offset China’s advantages in geography and missile power? What is the actual strategy if war were to break out against China — and not the rather vague National Defense Strategy that seeks to compete, deter and defeat?
Regarding Russia, given the huge losses it has taken in its conventional forces, some argue up to losing half its capability, in the future, will it rely more heavily on its numerical advantage in nuclear weapons?
But will the U.S. use this as an opportunity to challenge its strategy at both geopolitical and military levels and its assumptions? If not, could America become a future Russia in the next war if it comes and repeat its history of losing every war it started? Few have raised this question.
Fourth, here is a thought experiment. Suppose NATO massively intervened with force on Ukraine’s side. Clearly, a combination of U.S., British, French and other NATO members’ air and missile dominance, as well as experience in combined operations, would have brought to bear what General Colin Powell initially called “overwhelming force.” Russian forces would have been eviscerated as Iraq’s forces were twice in 1991 and 2003.
That is not to argue NATO should directly intervene militarily in Ukraine, which it will not and should not. To make the point, massive military superiority has a quality and quantity of its own. Will the U.S. and NATO do a careful analysis of the military balance with Russia and appreciate where that balance rests?
Finally is the missing dimension in analyses. As Sun Tzu argued in “The Art of War,” the second best strategy is to defeat the enemy’s strategy. How then does one go about doing that? Attack and disrupt the command structure. In this case, Russian incompetence played a large and possibly decisive role in enabling Ukraine’s defenses.
No one predicted this. Nor did anyone foresee the political chaos caused by Yevgeny Prigozhin’s failed mutiny and its aftermath. This should refocus Western thinking, not on regime change but on disruption. Now that is a lesson worth re-learning.
Harlan Ullman, Ph.D., is a senior advisor at Washington, D.C.’s Atlantic Council and the prime author of the “shock and awe” doctrine. His 12th book, “The Fifth Horseman and the New MAD: How Massive Attacks of Disruption Became the Looming Existential Danger to a Divided Nation and the World at Large,” is available on Amazon. He can be reached on Twitter @harlankullman.