We’re going to need that Ukraine no-fly zone after all
Shortly after the start of Russia’s large-scale invasion on Feb. 24, 2022, Ukraine asked the West for no-fly zones over Ukraine.
At the time, NATO rejected Kyiv’s proposal as too risky. But in mid-2023, after a year and a half of war, an international commitment to counter Russian missiles and drones, at least in the rear areas of Ukraine, presents itself in a new light.
What Ukraine now needs are no-fly zones for unmanned aerial objects. This would benefit not only Ukraine, but also a world depending upon its bounty. Russia’s war of terror, using long-range weapons against the Ukrainian population, touches the core interests of many states outside of Eastern Europe in at least four ways.
First, Ukraine’s ability to continue producing and exporting food is not just a humanitarian and economic issue. It is also necessary for maintaining global stability. A shortage and renewed rise in staple food prices has serious international social and political implications. These include unstable governments, hunger riots, migration flows, growing xenophobia and possibly even civil and interstate wars.
The deployment of non-Ukrainian air and air defense forces over Ukraine to secure its food production and delivery is not just a matter of solidarity. Such out-of-area deployment by NATO and other nations would serve to mitigate broader risks to international security. Preventing starvation and its destructive consequences for the global order is reason enough to consider establishing no-fly zones over and around Ukraine.
Second, Ukrainian nuclear power plants — including the decommissioned Chernobyl plant — have repeatedly become sites, instruments and targets of Russian military activity. The cross-border risks posed by such behavior across Europe are obvious. As with its food supply, Kyiv’s own interest in protecting its nuclear power plants is secondary to a broader global need. Military engagement by NATO and other allies to secure Ukrainian nuclear reactors affects existential interests of many states.
Third, Kyiv has been the target of weekly Russian missile and drone strikes since October 2022. Whether intentional or not, Russia’s long-range weapons have repeatedly damaged civilian objects and wounded or killed noncombatants in the Ukrainian capital. Kyiv is home to dozens of foreign embassies and offices of numerous international governmental and nongovernmental organizations.
Curiously, the security of thousands of visitors and delegates from NATO member states and other countries depends entirely on Ukraine’s missile defense system over the capital. These officials, as well as other foreign taxpayers, cannot yet count on the protection of air defense forces from their own countries, either on the way to Kyiv or inside the city. And this despite the explicit request of the Ukrainian government for such help.
Finally, Ukrainian reconstruction is beginning with the support of foreign repair and development projects. In the coming months and years, billions of euros and dollars of Western taxpayers’ money will be poured into the de-mining and renewal of Ukraine. This increases the national interest of Western and non-Western states in basic security in Ukraine. The issue of protecting internationally funded civilian infrastructure from Russian warheads is therefore likely to become increasingly urgent.
Moreover, despite complicated insurance issues, private direct investment in Ukraine is seen by many observers as a key factor in Ukraine’s rebirth. Especially in the case of large office or factory buildings constructed or renovated with the help of foreign companies, the question of their protection from Russian air strikes arises. Governments of those countries where the headquarters of companies active in Ukraine, and where their insurers are located, will come under increasing pressure to help Kyiv secure foreign direct investment.
Many observers see Western-backed no-fly zones over the Ukrainian hinterland as a path to World War III. But it is unlikely that such an escalation would occur, so long as Western troops are not deployed on the front lines.
Russia does not use manned combat aircraft in its attacks in the Ukrainian hinterland. If Western fighter jets and anti-aircraft weapons hit Russian flying objects, they will not kill Russian servicemembers.
A new diplomatic and public discussion of the old Ukrainian demand for no-fly zones is necessary. It must rationally weigh the advantages and risks of implementing this or that variant of this idea. It needs a sober assessment of what is in the best interest of European and other states for no-fly zones over and around Ukraine.
Such a comprehensive assessment should determine the further course of action by a coalition of states willing to provide such support.
Andreas Umland is an analyst at the Stockholm Center for Eastern European Studies at the Swedish Institute of International Affairs.
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