For Ukraine, ‘defending’ means losing

After 573 days of war, Washington still cannot decide if it really wants Ukraine to win.

“Defending” remains the watchword of the day. Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin doubled-down on defense during the 15th Ukraine Defense Contact Group meeting held at Ramstein air base in Germany on September 19^, where he called upon allies to provide Ukraine with “additional air defense systems and interceptors” — specifically, Patriot, IRIS-T, HAWK, NASAMS, SAMP/T, and other air-defense systems. 

He opened the meeting by stating, “Air defense is saving lives. So, I urge this group to continue to dig deep on ground-based air defense for Ukraine.” He also emphasized the necessity for air defense to “protect Ukraine’s critical infrastructure, including grain and energy supplies.”   

While that is all true, no amount of air defense is going to displace the 200,000 troops in occupied Ukraine that Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Mark Milley described in an interview with CNN on September 18. That will only be accomplished through offense.

Air defense weapons will not destroy or damage the Kerch Strait Bridge or any other bridge sustaining Russian forces on the Crimean Peninsula from Russia or Russian occupied southern Ukraine by ground transport or rail. Nor will they affect the sea ports and airfields. Russia’s ability to wage war will continue, unabated.

Nor, significantly, can they affect Russia’s third defensive line near the village of Robotyne in the Zaporizhzhia Oblast. Ukrainian Generals told the Guardian newspaper that “80 percent of Russia’s effort went into building its first and second lines,” yet Trent Maul, Director of Analysis for the Defense Intelligence Agency, cautions that the “bulk of Russia’s reinforcements remain at the third.” 

Moreover, Moscow has had additional time to prepare hardened defensive positions and emplace anti-personnel and anti-tank mines, as it did along its first defensive line.

No wonder Milley referenced a “very high bar,” when warning that a Ukrainian victory will take a “very long time.” It is a sad irony that the Biden Administration has made that bar higher by failing to greenlight the weapons Ukraine needs for a decisive victory. But the irony seems lost on the outgoing chairman.

Although they are welcome, additional air defense systems are not the path to a Ukrainian victory. Rather, added precision deep strike capabilities are needed to render the Crimean Peninsula “untenable.” President Joe Biden should heed this very advice from his retired generals Jack Keane, David Petraeus and Ben Hodges.

It has been nearly two weeks since ABC News suggested that the Biden Administration was considering supplying Ukraine with the Army Tactical Missile Systems, or ATACMS. President Joe Biden, in his Tuesday address to the United Nations General Assembly, despite Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky in attendance, made no reference to ATACMS. Instead, Biden reiterated his call to world leaders to stand firm against “naked aggression,” and once again “cast solidarity with Ukraine in its war with Russia as a necessary step to deter other would-be aggressors.”

Like Austin’s prepared comments in Ramstein, there was also no mention of the word “win.” This, despite a senior State Department official telling reporters on August 30 that, “It’s very important that Ukraine win this war. And by ‘win,’ I mean as President Biden said, Russians leave all of Ukraine.”

So what changed? Did Kim Jong Un’s trip to Russia and the possibility of a technology exchange enabling North Korean nuclear delivery capabilities affect the White House’s ATACMS decision-making calculus?

General George S. Patton said it best: “Nobody ever defended anything successfully. There is only attack and attack and attack some more.” In Ukraine, at a minimum, that equates to ATACMS, F-16 fighter jets and HIMARS-delivered cluster munitions. It means M26 dual-purpose improved conventional munitions rockets supporting a push by Ukraine south toward the Sea of Azov and the Crimean Peninsula.

Together with the Ukrainian military’s current capabilities, these additional U.S. weapon systems and munitions, coupled with intelligence, can accelerate the liberation of Crimea and all of Ukraine. 

Interdicting drones, ballistic missiles, and hypersonic missiles over the skies of Ukraine will not win the war. Austin and Milley know this. It is merely an extension of the attrition-based battle being waged on the ground, in the trenches — substituting soldiers for missiles, at an unsustainable cost.

What wins the war is to strike the launch sites beyond Ukraine’s borders; to destroy weapons systems that launch the drones and fire the missiles; to interdict munitions before they are fired; to destroy “third line” defensive fortifications before the lead elements of the assault force arrive.

The deep fight and interdiction of supply lines are what Ukraine so desperately needs to win this war.

“Air defense systems and interceptors” are a critical and a necessary component of the solution to defend the lives of innocent civilians, critical infrastructure, and ground forces. But they will not expedite the outcome of the war. Bringing the war to a conclusion sooner will do more to meet Austin’s objectives and save lives.

Austin correctly asserts that, “the more Russia prolongs its war, the more glaring its cruelty becomes. Russia’s assaults have increased far beyond the battlefield and inflicted untold human suffering.” 

Together with Milley’s comment that “Ejecting Russian soldiers from the entirety of Ukraine is going to take a long time and will be a very significant effort over a considerable amount of time,” they serve to reinforce the necessity of giving Zelensky and his generals the weapons and munitions they need to win the war now — not to simply “ensure that Ukraine can deter future aggression and defend its sovereign territory.” 

The words missing here are “urgency” and “win.” In one breath, Austin warns about the hazards of a prolonged war, but in the next he says, “So make no mistake: we will stand by the Ukrainian people for the long haul.” 

Regrettably, there may not be a long haul for Ukraine. Support for the war is trending downward in the U.S. According to a CNN poll last month, 51 percent believe “the U.S. has done enough to help Ukraine in the fight against Russia.” When Russia first invaded in early 2022, the same poll showed 62 percent wanting the U.S. to do more for Ukraine.

A former Biden Administration official told NBC News that “Biden understands that time is short. I don’t think he can sustain the level of funding for much longer. That’s why you’re seeing Zelensky [coming to] the White House. It’s all about keeping the pressure up…There’s not a blank check here.”

If Senator Rand Paul (R-Ky.) has his way, any funding bill to keep the government open past Sept. 30 will be held up if it includes funding for the war in Ukraine.

The time is now for bold and decisive White House action and leadership. 

Jonathan Sweet, a retired Army Colonel and 30-year military intelligence officer, led the U.S. European Command Intelligence Engagement Division from 2012 to 2014. Mark Toth is an economist, entrepreneur, and former board member of the World Trade Center, St. Louis.