As horrible and despicable as it was, Operation al Aqsa Flood will make history.
Not only do the attacks embody one of the gravest, if not the direst debacle in Israel’s existence. They will likely motivate and inspire terrorists and non-state actors everywhere for many years to come, in a sort of David vs Goliath type of fantasy.
But why were the strikes so effective? What was it that Hamas did so well? Amongst the myriad of observations to be made, three are worth emphasizing.
- Hamas has proven itself to be a master of the surprise attack. After the Cold War, the concept regained prominence as post-9/11 analysts framed mass-casualty terrorism as a “strategic surprise.” Hoover fellow John Lewis Gaddis said this kind of strike uses force “in an unexpected way at an unexpected time … to achieve what more conventional methods of warfare cannot.” This is exactly what Hamas, which is strong but weaker compared to the Israel Defense Forces, managed to achieve in southern Israel. When no one was expecting it, the Gazan group attacked Israel through air, land and sea. It used drones and paragliders to neutralize communication towers across the border, jamming super-advanced sensors. Bulldozers then breached through the fence, making way for hundreds of fighters on jeeps, pick-ups and motorbikes. All of the above, covered by thousands of rockets defying the multimillion-dollar Iron Dome. Shocked and unprepared, Israel took more than two days to repel the last Hamas fighters on its territory.
- The timing of the attack has been nearly perfect. Allegedly, Hamas took two years to orchestrate and launch Operation al Aqsa Flood. Even though uncertainty as to the exact planning period remains, the choice of this particular moment has been strategic. To begin with, symbols and recurrences matter. Inflicting a humiliating blow nearly 50 years to the date after the start of the Yom Kippur War, reiterating that technologically inferior forces can still cause great harm, bears an unmatchable symbolic legacy destined to become legend among terrorists and extremists. Furthermore, the attack has come at a time of unprecedented societal division within Israel. Led by one of the most right-wing coalitions in history, Israel has seen severe polarization undermining social cohesion. Netanyahu’s judicial reforms have sparked months of public demonstrations in defense of democracy and the rule of law. Additionally, Israel has witnessed arguably unparalleled friction between its politicians, armed forces and intelligence community, all of whom were unable to predict Hamas’s intentions.
- Hamas executed a textbook example of psychological warfare. Terrorism is, first and foremost, one of the most developed forms of psychological warfare. Once attacks have occurred, terrorists must amplify their actions as much as possible in the most spectacular way to attract media attention, without which terrorism is nothing. In this regard, Hamas did it all. As its operatives stormed Israeli towns, kibbutzim — “Israeli communities near Gaza” — and festivals, Hamas flooded the web with dozens of live videos featuring the massacre and kidnapping of hundreds of innocent civilians. As Hamas keeps releasing bone-chilling videos of hostages to dampen Israeli morale, the Israeli public has been invited to delete public apps, with doctors fearing long-term mental implications for younger generations.
Aware that a) it is still too early to jump to conclusions and b) the operational environment keeps developing, Western armed forces should internalize three main points:
- The war on terror is not over. On the contrary, terrorism is alive and kicking, for it continues to destabilize entire parts of the Middle East, Asia, and Africa. Certainly, Ukraine and, looking forward, Taiwan, the Australia-United Kingdom-U.S. coalition, the Arctic and the militarization of outer space are likely to dominate the field of international security. However, believing Western forces will no longer be directly or indirectly involved in counterterrorism-related matters may be unwise.
- Dynamic and adaptive, terrorists learn. We study them, they study us. Western armed forces should not belittle this aspect, for the enemy always gets a vote and should be respected. Fifty years ago, Israel was still basking in the glorious outcome of the 1967 war and did not envision its enemies being capable of putting together plans to overcome a far more superior force. At least to some extent, this happened again on Oct. 7. Western armed forces should avoid making the same mistakes and preach humility. Faith in superior technology cannot trump human scrutiny, for analysis and imagination are still key.
- Civil-military relations must not be disregarded. Terrorists prey on social and political division. In an increasingly interconnected world, Western armed forces cannot afford to be detached from the political sphere. This is not to argue for the politicization of the military. But, in line with the work of RAND’s Huw Strachan and Ruth Harris, a more inclusive and frank policy debate that further takes the military dimension into account is crucial for more effective national security strategies.
Michele Groppi Ph.D. is a lecturer in defense studies in the Defense Studies Department at King’s College London and president of the International Team for the Study of Security Verona.
Manos Karagiannis Ph.D. is a reader in international security in the Defense Studies Department at King’s College London.