In Ukraine and the Middle East, only force can restore deterrence

By killing three U.S. reservists, Iran and its proxies have forced the questions of deterrence and escalation to the forefront of U.S. policymaking. However, these questions are not confined to the wars now roiling the Middle East, but apply equally to the war in Ukraine, Chinese threats of aggression against Taiwan and in the South China Sea and the increasing danger of a North Korean attack against South Korea.  

All of these threats are, to one degree or another, ripostes to our inadequate thinking about escalation and deterrence.  

The administration’s view is that Washington and its allies must avoid escalating the situation in the Middle East to a general regional war and turning the conventional war in Ukraine into a potential nuclear war. To that end, it has sought to restrain Israel and push them toward a two-state solution. It has also constrained the shipment of weapons to Ukraine, the consequences of which have already been seen there. Likewise, it has only struck back at Iran’s proxies a few times, despite over 150 attacks on U.S. forces and personnel.  

However, these efforts to avoid escalation have been resounding failures. The Houthis and other Iranian proxies are clearly undeterred. Likewise, Russian President Vladimir Putin firmly believes the West is disorganized, demoralized, unwilling to sustain Ukraine’s defense and, in general, an effete society whose time has passed. Therefore, he is or at least professes to be confident in Russia’s victory.

This underscores the point that the issue is not to avoid escalation but to restore deterrence by retaking control of the escalation process and depriving our enemies of that leverage. Sadly, our previous failure to grasp what deterrence in these cases entails has now made the discriminating use of force necessary.  

Admittedly these unique situations require tailored actions to restore deterrence. But for both, tailoring our responses with strategic and discriminating uses of force is, nonetheless, necessary. If we focus on preventing escalation rather than restoring deterrence, we will get more escalation and less deterrence.  

Since the issue is regaining control of the “escalation ladder”, which enables the U.S. and allies in both theaters to restore deterrence, we must now act resolutely. The U.S. and NATO must provide Ukraine with the weapons it needs to defeat Russia and regain its prewar territorial integrity and sovereignty. That also means providing for its membership in NATO and the regeneration of the alliance’s military capability for as long as Russia, under Putin or his successors, insists on a European empire.  

By restoring conventional deterrence in Europe, we prevent similar wars and regain control over escalatory processes. We also strengthen nuclear deterrence, meaning Russia’s habitual resort to bloodcurdling nuclear threats will diminish over time, if not disappear entirely, especially under a new Russian regime. 

Reestablishing deterrence means using disproportionate force against Iran and its proxies not only to convey resolution but also to impose unaffordable costs on Iran for allowing its proxies free rein against the U.S. and its regional allies — the real target in the Red Sea and Jordan.

Ariel Sharon famously remarked that terrorism has an address, the implication being that those charged with deterrence should send a direct message to control escalation and reestablish peace. We should, therefore, send Iran and its proxies a direct show of force, and do so decisively and in disproportionate terms. 

In Ukraine, we need to restore conventional deterrence and reinforce nuclear deterrence. We must dispel the notion that Russia or anyone else can simply start a war against the U.S., its interests and its allies and use the threat of escalation into a wider or even a nuclear war to prevail. Sustaining partners and allies in Ukraine is the sole path to peace and security.  

These lessons are in full view in these two wars. While we may dislike the lessons, the results of disregarding them are now indisputable facts. And facts, as both John Adams and Nikita Khrushchev have reminded us, are stubborn things.

Stephen Blank, Ph.D., is a Foreign Policy Research Institute senior fellow and independent consultant focused on the geopolitics and geostrategy of the former Soviet Union, Russia and Eurasia. He is a former professor of Russian national security studies and national security affairs at the Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College and a former MacArthur fellow at the U.S. Army War College.