A stronger NATO requires smarter spending, not more spending

NATO is celebrating its 75th anniversary this year. Apparently, wisdom doesn’t always come with age.

At a recent campaign event, former President Donald Trump, the presumptive 2024 Republican nominee, made some alarming comments about NATO, suggesting that the U.S. would refuse to protect countries that don’t meet the alliance’s 2 percent defense spending threshold.

Pundits and policymakers on both sides of the Atlantic have used Trump’s threat as a bullhorn to push for increased NATO defense spending — particularly as Ukraine struggles to halt further Russian advances, now two full years into the invasion.

Indeed, just days after Trump’s remarks, NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg echoed the former president’s concerns and forecasted that an unprecedented number of European member countries will meet the 2 percent spending guideline in 2024.

Europe’s apparent renewed commitment to NATO is a promising development. But both Trump and Stoltenberg are missing the forest for the trees. NATO indeed has a spending problem, but not because partner nations aren’t spending enough; rather, it’s because NATO doesn’t need a spending guideline at all.

First introduced only in 2006 and propelled into action amid the 2014 Crimea crisis, the 2 percent guideline is intended to bolster NATO’s deterrence and defensive posture. Critically, it is not an obligation for countries to meet this benchmark — it is only an aspirational target to be reached over time by individual partners. This has produced mixed results.

There are many reasons why member nations don’t typically meet the 2 percent threshold, but the current framework doesn’t directly address this issue. The emphasis on increased spending favors quantity over quality and input over output. It also ignores the fiscal challenge that even a 2 percent benchmark can represent for smaller economies that, much like NATO itself, are still stuck in the Cold War.

This threshold obviously exacerbates tensions with Russia and complicates the possibility of solving the current conflict through diplomatic channels. But it also has the unintended effect of straining relations with the U.S. by instigating a transactional, quid pro quoattitude toward cost-sharing burdens.

The possibility of Trump moving back into the White House could mean many things for NATO. Europeans must prepare for a world in which they can’t take the American calvary for granted, whether because the U.S. public is tired of endless war at their own expense or simply because, as Russian President Vladimir Putin himself admitted, Trump isn’t the most predictable commander in chief.

Some NATO partners are waking up to this new reality for Europe. And they have more than the capabilities necessary to secure the alliance, even without American support.

But why tempt fate? Rather than keeping the threshold and risking a full withdrawal of American forces, NATO should nix it altogether and negotiate a path forward that leverages not only the militaries but also the economies and diplomatic relationships of each partner.

This added flexibility is long overdue. The security landscape has dramatically shifted since the inception of the 2 percent guideline. Cyber attacks, AI, terrorism, climate change, mass migration and a host of other issues have moved to the fore, requiring investments in technology, intelligence and nontraditional security capabilities. These areas of defense do not always necessitate large-scale military spending, rendering the 2 percent metric increasingly irrelevant.

Abolishing the spending guideline does not and should not result in the U.S. totally abandoning its European allies; there is still room for collaboration, negotiation and partnership based on free trade, diplomacy, intelligence and even military action (when absolutely necessary) to meet new and evolving threats.

Rather than clinging to an arbitrary figure, NATO should adopt a more transparent, nuanced and flexible framework that considers the diverse capabilities and economic realities of its members; it should measure and report all defense spending, and adjust them accordingly to address specific security challenges, economic conditions and strategic capabilities. Long-term, the alliance might even benefit from the creation of its own bank.

Additionally, focusing on collective outcomes — such as enhanced interoperability, shared technological advancements and joint training exercises — could provide a more accurate measure of NATO’s health. This capability-based model would encourage members to invest in areas where they can provide the most value, enhancing NATO’s collective defense posture while also targeting much more localized security concerns.

NATO is more vital now than ever before, as other international institutions are proving to be increasingly ineffective guarantors of security and stability. The U.N. has all but admitted its own ineptitude in the face of global crises; meanwhile, the E.U. is wrestling with its numerous domestic policy failures.

For 75 years, NATO has helped promote a safe and stable Europe. To further sustain this hard-fought peace, NATO should abandon its uneven and unequal spending demands, which create more conflicts than they resolve.

Gabe Benitez is a fundraising professional at the University of Chicago, a volunteer with the Chicago Covenants Project and Crossing Party Lines, and a contributor for Young Voices.