Is America preparing to abandon NATO and Europe?

At the recently concluded Munich Security Conference, American officials delivered a message that was both familiar and ominous: Europe must do more for its own defense. While this refrain has been heard before, this year’s conference had a different tenor.

The uncertainty surrounding America’s future commitment to NATO has never been higher, as senior officials hinted at growing impatience within Washington. If European allies continue to underinvest in their militaries and rely disproportionately on American security guarantees, they may soon find themselves without them.

French President Charles de Gaulle once remarked, “Treaties are like roses … They last while they last.” His skepticism about American dominance in European security remains relevant today. Likewise, Canadian Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau famously observed, “Living next to you [the U.S.] is in some ways like sleeping with an elephant … No matter how friendly and even-tempered is the beast, one is affected by every twitch and grunt.”

Both statements capture the lingering concerns among NATO allies, which include the reliability of American leadership; the extent to which Europe can, or must, stand on its own; and the implications for Canada and Europe of a world in which U.S. security guarantees can no longer be taken for granted.

It is difficult to overstate NATO’s historical significance. Born in the early years of the Cold War as a bulwark against Soviet expansionism, it provided the security framework for an American-led transatlantic order. When the Berlin Wall fell, NATO found new purpose in consolidating democracy in Eastern Europe, expanding its membership and engaging in out-of-area operations.

But history moves forward, not in circles, and the strategic environment that once justified NATO’s existence has changed beyond recognition. In 2025, the world is neither bipolar, as it was during the Cold War, nor is it unipolar, as it was in the 1990s. We live in an era of multipolarity, where American hegemony is contested, and the assumptions that underpinned NATO’s longevity are eroding.

The idea that the U.S. might withdraw from NATO has been dismissed for years as alarmism, attributed to President Trump’s personal disdain for the alliance. But reducing this issue to Trump’s temperament is myopic. Even without Trump, the U.S. would be reassessing its role in NATO — not because of one president’s idiosyncrasies, but because the fundamental logic behind America’s leadership in the alliance no longer holds.

Today’s geopolitical realities have little in common with the world NATO was built to manage. America’s foremost strategic challenge is no longer in Europe but in the Indo-Pacific, where China’s rise presents a direct challenge to U.S. power. Meanwhile, Russia, though still a threat to Eastern Europe, is a diminished force compared to its Soviet predecessor. The war in Ukraine has exposed the limits of Russian military capability but also reinforced an uncomfortable truth: The U.S. remains the backbone of European security, while Europe remains reluctant or unable to take full responsibility for its own defense.

The U.S. strategic community is increasingly questioning the costs and benefits of maintaining NATO as it now exists. America spends more on defense than all of its NATO allies combined, yet European powers continue to underinvest in their own militaries. Despite years of American pressure, most NATO members still fail to meet spending target of 2 percent of GDP. If the U.S. disengages from NATO, it will not be because of one administration’s rhetoric but because the alliance no longer serves America’s highest strategic priorities.

How would Europe react to an American withdrawal from NATO? The continent is woefully unprepared for such an eventuality. European nations have long relied on Washington’s security guarantees as a substitute for serious military investment.

While some European leaders have floated ideas about “strategic autonomy,” the reality is that the EU lacks the cohesion, military capability or political will to replace NATO. France and Germany disagree on the future of European defense, while Eastern European states, particularly Poland and the Baltics, still see America, not Brussels, as their primary security guarantor. A U.S. exit from NATO would expose these fractures, forcing Europe to confront its own strategic vulnerabilities.

Moreover, a post-NATO Europe would be a continent of competing security arrangements, not a single cohesive defense bloc. The most likely outcome would be a security framework centered around the most militarily capable states — France, the U.K. and possibly Germany — with smaller nations band-wagoning out of necessity. Meanwhile, Eastern European states would seek bilateral or minilateral security arrangements, potentially deepening their ties with the U.S. outside of NATO’s framework. Such a scenario would fundamentally reshape transatlantic relations, leaving Europe in a precarious position in an era of global instability.

The demise of NATO is not inevitable, but neither is its indefinite survival. The world that gave birth to the alliance no longer exists, and neither does the logic that once sustained it. If the U.S. steps back from NATO, it will not be because of isolationism, but because American grand strategy must prioritize competition with China and a more restrained approach to global commitments.

The real question is whether Europe is prepared for a world in which U.S. security guarantees are no longer unconditional. If NATO’s future depends on America indefinitely underwriting European defense, then NATO, in its current form, has no future at all.

Andrew Latham is a professor of international relations at Macalester College in Saint Paul, Minn., a senior fellow at the Institute for Peace and Diplomacy, and a non-resident fellow at Defense Priorities in Washington, D.C.