Vladimir Putin’s unprovoked attack on Ukraine threatens the international order’s independence and sovereignty, which have been the object of U.S. foreign and security policy for 80 years. A collapsed international order imperils allies’ and partners’ security, freedom of navigation, human rights, and free enterprise the world over. The conflict is of direct interest to the U.S.
As of noon today, the tactical situation in Ukraine is fluid, but it appears that Russian forces have crossed the “Line of Contact” in Donbas, landed in Odesa and Mariupol, and crossed the Russian-Ukrainian border near Kharkiv. Moreover, Russia is conducting a series of pre-planned strikes against civilian and military infrastructure, with explosions reported in Dnipro, Kyiv, and elsewhere.
In the coming hours, Russian airstrikes will continue. Kharkiv will be assaulted, resulting in brutal urban combat. The Russian amphibious assault against Mariupol is likely to be coupled with a ground attack from Donbas and quite likely an aerial assault from Crimea. Russia’s attack on Odesa demonstrates the broad scope of its intentions. In the coming days, Putin may order an assault on Kyiv.
President Biden, along with NATO allies, have long since chosen not to commit ground forces to Ukraine’s defense; only Ukrainians will defend Ukraine. NATO’s sanction response will have an impact, given the Russian economy’s inherent fragility and the apparently coordinated nature of economic pressure. However, it will take time for sanctions to have an effect, creating a lag between action and punishment. Deterrence, it is important to remember, does not end once a conflict begins, particularly for a nuclear-armed power like Russia. The West must take action to ensure the Atlantic Alliance’s territorial security, limit Russia’s military gains, and prepare for counter-escalation if necessary.
Deterrence is crucial, moreover, given Russia’s apparently maximalist territorial objectives. Putin’s speech to Russia, delivered yesterday and almost certainly prerecorded, coincided with a UN Security Council meeting that the Ukrainians had requested, likely because they knew an invasion was imminent. Putin denied plans to occupy Ukraine, instead hoping to demilitarize it. This is political double-speak. The only way to demilitarize Ukraine is to topple the independent elected government in Kyiv and install a friendly regime. Moreover, Putin delivered a clear threat to any power hoping to intervene, threatening harsh and immediate consequences. We know not what Putin considers “intervention,” but the Atlantic Alliance must consider that even military movement or the provision of aid may trigger a Russian response.
Thus, the Western powers must take six steps to ensure the security of Allied interests as this crisis escalates, and to deter future escalation.
First, the U.S. and its allies must rapidly forward-deploy division-strength combat elements to Romania, Bulgaria, Poland, and the Baltics. The greatest risk to NATO is Russian horizontal escalation, that is, an offensive in the Baltics and Black Sea. Russian ground forces are overwhelmingly concentrated along Ukraine’s border, limiting the prospects of an immediate offensive against the Baltics. However, the Russian Navy has deployed a heavy presence to the Black Sea and Eastern Mediterranean, including multiple Surface Action Groups, at least half a dozen submarines equipped with cruise missiles and air defense systems.
The U.S.’ XVIII Airborne Corps, its premier rapid-reaction force, is the most reasonable option for immediate deployment. Alongside these, the U.S. must prioritize air defenses and surface-launched anti-surface and anti-ship missiles. Additionally, the U.S. should challenge Russian naval forces in the Mediterranean, buzzing warships, tracking submarines, and probing air defenses. These will raise the cost of Russian horizontal escalation against NATO allies, while disrupting current Russian operational capabilities.
Second, NATO should prepare for kinetic Russian harassment against any forces attempting to resupply Ukraine. The most likely transit point is Lviv, given embassy relocations to that city, and if needed, its probable use as a second capital. Ground forces, for now, are out of the question, but the U.S. must be prepared to extract any personnel it deploys. A limited force, around brigade-level, with air and intelligence support should be prepared for this operation.
Third — if it has not done so already — NATO should execute a major cyber response to a Russian invasion. Russia’s standard playbook includes cyber operations against critical public infrastructure like banking, government sites, and emergency services. This would not be warranted unless Russia horizontally escalates. However, even before this, the U.S. should consider escalating cyber and electronic pressure against Russian state institutions and the Russian military. U.S. Air Force and Army electronic warfare (EW) units forward deployed to Romania can, particularly if airborne, jam Russian communications and disrupt Russian air operations. U.S. Cyber Command can disrupt Russian communications between Rostov and Ukraine, and if needed, broaden attacks to the whole of society.
Fourth, U.S. naval forces should operate near Russian naval bastions, publicly through major surface naval exercises, and covertly by infiltrating the Okhotsk and Barents Seas. These bastions remain crucial to Russian naval strategy. They provide Russia with necessary second-strike insurance. Throughout the Cold War, Russia’s greatest fear was a nuclear imbalance that would encourage an American first-strike — a phantom of the Soviet imagination, but relevant to their strategic calculus. This same fear can motivate Putin. Pressuring these naval bastions tells the Kremlin that the U.S. is prepared for a long-term conflict if Putin decides to attack NATO members.
Fifth, the U.S. Navy should deploy a guided-missile submarine to the Eastern Mediterranean. The Ohio-class SSGN carries 156 cruise missiles, enough armament to attack multiple Russian targets with no warning. In January, the USS Georgia was sited near Cyprus; the boat should be returned to that location and placed on standby.
Sixth, the U.S. Air Force should consider forward-deploying strategic bombers to central Europe, in preparation for stand-off strikes in the Baltic or Black Seas, or, if Russia escalates, to provide an additional credible nuclear deterrent. Alongside this, the U.S. Navy should increase the number of submarines on European deterrence patrol, a fact it need not publicize to make it known to Russia.
Putin is at war. He may not be at war with us, but he is at war. Any response to Russian actions that fails to deter future escalation risks the security of the U.S. and its allies and partners.
Seth Cropsey is founder and president of Yorktown Institute based in Washington, D.C. He served as a naval officer and as deputy Undersecretary of the Navy.