Who will define the ‘national interest’?

Like many seismic geopolitical events, the Russian invasion of Ukraine has revealed ideological proclivities far more clearly than do abstract statements of principle or stale characterizations of “left v. right” or “hawk v. dove.” In the United States, such revelations are not only worrying but emblematic of a nation unclear about its national interests and role on the world stage.

On one side, we have a Democratic Party establishment in thrall to progressive dogma, for whom climate change is seen as a greater national security threat than are either China or Russia. Military readiness has taken a back seat to identifying white supremacists and expelling anti-vaxxers from the ranks, and “woke” military brass have yet to be held to account for a disastrous Afghanistan withdrawal that showcased America’s weakness to our adversaries. Democratic policymakers traditionally have sought to express American influence through multilateral institutions and alliances; more recently, they have attached almost religious reverence to an otherwise sensible tradition and have come to see it as an end in itself, rather than as a means of advancing American objectives.

Even more damaging is the institutional left’s willful, ideologically-driven squandering of a brief ascendancy of American energy independence, which simultaneously hands many of our adversaries — Russia foremost among them — a powerful strategic advantage while limiting our ability to act as a net exporter of hydrocarbons to support allies and the world economy through a moderating influence on commodity prices. 

That a party that has taken various actions imperiling American energy security and contrary to American interests — among them, the Biden administration’s May 2021 waiver of sanctions on the Nord Stream 2 pipeline from Russia to Germany, cancellation of the Keystone XL oil pipeline from Canada, and blocking petroleum sales in the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge — purports to be strong on national security issues (does anyone still remember the “America is back” refrain from the administration’s early days?) is risible.

Unfortunately, the void left by these and other feckless policies has not been filled by the opposition party. While perhaps representing a relatively smaller faction of the Republican right than do the ranks of the misguided on the Democratic left, neo-isolationist voices have found a ready audience among “the new right.” While typically cloaked in the rhetoric of realpolitik, within Republican circles there are those who would normalize autocracy, acknowledge (as in the case of Russian aggression) geographic “spheres of influence,” and validate the notion that NATO’s eastward expansion — notwithstanding its character as a defensive alliance — was and remains a needless provocation. Such voices revel in conflating Russia’s invasion of Ukraine with President Biden’s negligence in protecting our own southern border, utilizing such sleight of hand to obfuscate that respect for borders and sovereignty isn’t a relativistic concept. 

The party of Reagan now houses views such as those credited to Steve Bannon — to wit, that Ukraine “is not even a country,” likely news to a nation that voluntarily surrendered its nuclear weapons, pursuant to the Budapest Memorandum of 1994, in exchange for respect of its territorial integrity — suggesting there is something well short of unanimity on the American right in support of what once was termed liberal internationalism pursued in the national interest.

Whether of the “left” or “right,” these myopic views reflect a sort of ideological self-absorption, rooted in a perception that we inhabit a rational, post-conflict world in which geopolitical unseriousness is devoid of consequences. As has been noted in myriad other contexts, the echo chambers of Twitter and other social media platforms are not real life, which stubbornly continues to resist the paradigms the metaverse seeks to impose upon it.

Of course, such superficiality in foreign affairs cannot be ascribed primarily to maladjusted technology and media, and has been decades in the making. The United States wasted the unipolar moment ensuing from the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, best illustrated by its guileless attempt to seamlessly incorporate Communist China into the global economy and rules-based order, with implications that our business and public policy elites only now are beginning to appreciate. The past 30 years of American foreign policy can be seen in hindsight as a period marked by ill-conceived wars of choice (Iraq), failure to counter territorial incursions and domestic repression (Georgia, Crimea, the Donbas, Syria, Venezuela), regional power vacuums created by gross incompetence (Islamic State, Afghanistan), and examples of mixed foreign policy messaging too vast to catalogue comprehensively (Russia as a “regional power,”  China as our “strategic partner,” and so on).

Correcting the absence of a clearly defined and shared set of national interests starts with acknowledging that we — and all countries — have interests, which have yet to be superseded by vague concepts of “global citizenry” or boutique, non-national security concerns higher up Maslow’s hierarchy such as climate change. We may not care for the interests of revisionist powers, and actions manifested in support of them, but that doesn’t make them any less real or, in many cases, in need of a vigorous response. Many Americans fail to appreciate that even our allies have their own national interests and make considerable bipartisan efforts to advance them.

By contrast, America has allowed its longstanding leadership of the free world and global order to mutate into a “lead from behind” faith in multilateral institutions, which even when well-intended often fall prey to the tragedy of the commons. Is it possible for the U.S. to recover a widely-shared, well-defined set of national interests — and, if so, what are they?

A bipartisan consensus will require vigorous good-faith debate along the political spectrum. That said, perhaps Woodrow Wilson’s Fourteen Points, drawn from a kinetic era in international relations, are as good a place as any to start. 

Most of the Fourteen Points were specific to conditions associated with World War I, but generally the Points supported free trade, transparency among nations, democratic governance, self-determination, and territorial integrity. While idealistic and progressive for their time, these and principles like them sharpen a nation’s focus so that, for example, eastern European nations’ participation in a defensive alliance can be seen as hardly the provocation the invasion of a sovereign neighbor nation constitutes.

In the U.S, the national interest must be agreed and implemented through the democratic process.  To do so effectively, our representatives and other opinion leaders first must acknowledge that while some of us may want to believe we are done with history, history continues to demonstrate it’s not yet done with us.

Richard J. Shinder is the founder of Theatine Partners, a financial consultancy, and a frequent lecturer, speaker and panelist on business and financial topics. He has written extensively on economic, financial, geopolitical, cultural and corporate governance-related issues. Follow him on Twitter @RichardJShinder.