Several leaders in the United States and Europe have suggested supporting Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky’s plea for a no-fly zone over Ukraine. However, for a no-fly zone to be effective, U.S. and NATO nations must be willing to shoot down Russian aircraft. Top officials are reluctant to cross that line against a nuclear-armed peer adversary. Even if they did choose to pursue this action, they’d struggle to implement it given the dearth of modern fighters.
After three decades of underinvestment and unilateral focus on low-intensity conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq, western air forces — particularly the U.S. Air Force — may be too old and too small to competently engage top threats such as Russia and China.
No-fly zones involve several crucial airpower tools: fighter aircraft to clear the sky of enemy aircraft and manage the threat posed by surface-to-air missiles; command and control intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (C2ISR) systems such as the E-3 AWACS and E-7 Wedgetail to track airspace activity; and aerial refueling planes to increase range. Ukraine is a large country. Overlaying the U.S., it stretches from Chicago to the Atlantic lengthwise and from Detroit to Tennessee in depth. This demands many aircraft to provide adequate coverage.
Russian threats are significant, with their surface-to-air missile systems leading the world in their technical sophistication and lethality. Their fighters are also quite capable, especially when armed with modern missiles that often outperform our own.
While the U.S. and its NATO allies likely have enough refueling and C2ISR aircraft to sustain operations — albeit the majority built in the 1960s and 1970s and in need of modernization — the real capacity and capability crunch comes down to fighters. Western nations gutted their combat aircraft inventories after the Cold War and slow-rolled building new types. Too many of the remaining fighter planes are based on designs from the late 1960s and 1970s that were built decades ago. U.S. Air Force fighters average 30 years in age. These aircraft are worn and lack modern technologies to survive against high end threats.
The sole exception to this are the U.S.-built F-22 and F-35, the only modern fifth-generation fighters with the stealth, sensors and processing power required to give pilots favorable odds of executing their missions and getting home safe. However, because of shortsighted thinking amid wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, the U.S. canceled F-22 production at less than half its planned buy — just 187 aircraft procured. F-35s were supposed to be built in high volume, but technical problems earlier in the program and competing budget priorities saw build rates cut. Right now, the Air Force has just over 300 of these aircraft, with the U.S. Navy, U.S. Marine Corps, and a select number of allied nations possessing far fewer.
Things get even more bleak when considering total F-22 and F-35 inventories are not available for combat use. A significant number are tied up training pilots, testing new capabilities, or are down for major depot-level maintenance. This translates to fewer than 100 F-22s and 150 F-35s available for combat. No-fly zone enforcement requires the persistence of a rotational system. Generally speaking, one-third of the aircraft are executing the mission, another third are flying back to base, and the final third are getting ready to launch.
For the U.S. Air Force, this translates to roughly only 30 F-22s and 50 F-35s on station at any given time over the second largest country in Europe. These numbers do not account for aircraft down for maintenance or that no fifth-generation fighters would be available to check China’s aggression in the Pacific, or challenges by Iran or North Korea. Said another way, unilaterally committing the total Air Force F-22 and F-35 inventory gives a green light for another aggressor to launch hostilities. Yes, the Navy, Marine Corps and limited allied nations could contribute F-35s, but these numbers are not substantial at present.
Decisions made in the past are what they are, but policymakers could enhance future options. The F-35 production line is still active, meaning that the U.S. can boost the buy rate. The fiscal year 2023 budget request submitted by the Biden administration will be a major test in this regard. Allies also can submit further orders; Finland and Switzerland are the most recent allied nations choosing to buy the aircraft. Germany hopefully will follow soon. New types such as the Next Generation Air Dominance (NGAD) effort also will prove crucial in redressing the disastrous decision to prematurely curtail F-22 production.
No modern conflict can reasonably succeed without control of the sky. The quagmire in Ukraine speaks to the disastrous results that ensue when neither side holds this advantage. War devolves into a bloody skirmish on the ground, and innocent civilians suffer the most. Whether the U.S. and NATO ultimately choose to enforce a no-fly zone is a question no one can presently answer. What is certain is that these sorts of decisions will not go away.
It is crucial to reset our airpower capabilities to ensure that leaders have a robust set of options. Modern airpower cannot be generated with the flip of a switch. It takes careful planning. The stakes demand we get on with it.
Douglas Birkey is the executive director of the Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies.