America needs a Cabinet-level ‘Secretary of Digital’

When America reorganized its national security structure after World War II, it didn’t just create the CIA and National Security Council — it also formalized the idea that information and its flow across transnational lines must be a core tenant of U.S. national security. These information and intellectual property systems helped America win the Cold War, contributing to superior military technology that may have deterred all-out war.

Now, as China fills the gap left by the collapsed Soviet Union and rises as a great power, America needs a holistic approach to combat the many threats posed by emerging technologies like artificial intelligence and powerful semiconductor chips. One place to start is by creating a formal Cabinet position with an expert charged solely with guiding America’s tech policy into the 21st century and beyond.

This is a step many allies, including Japan, Taiwan and Germany, have already taken. The Biden administration should follow suit. The stakes are too great for this massive responsibility to be “shared by all but owned by nobody” in government. A senior-level official focused solely on emerging technology would articulate technological advancement’s potential promise and perils to the American people.

While the simpler technologies of the post-war period made it fairly easy to identify relevant national security issues and regulate them, governments now are often playing catch-up due to the vast commercial network of companies in new spaces like artificial intelligence. This means technology with national security implications may be developed with far less oversight, with the potential to accelerate before we can take steps to ensure it isn’t misused.

For example, gene editing technology like CRISPR has obvious medical benefits and may one day eliminate incurable diseases. But it could also be used to generate a dangerous bioweapon. This duality presents major challenges for our current regulatory set-up, as noted in a 2019 Deloitte analysis, and it is not one we are equipped to handle.

Another issue with similar dynamics is the much-publicized debate around the semiconductor industry and the flow of related technologies into and out of China. The U.S. recently finalized and expanded upon export control rules first implemented last year, a slow process highlighting both the stakes of the international chessboard and America’s shortcomings in the game.

As a collection of bipartisan legislators noted in a Reuters report earlier this month, this approach has thus far neglected open-source technology, allowing Beijing to exploit “a culture of open collaboration among American companies” that could “erode the current U.S. lead in the chip field.” This would have “very real battlefield implications,” according to retired Rear Admiral Mark Montgomery, who noted how chips are powering the use of AI on the battlefields of Ukraine — and could be deployed in future engagements with China.

Solving this challenge will not be easy. Some detractors have argued that placing any restrictions on open-source technology would limit innovation, hurting American security interests in the long run. Similar arguments could be made about gene-editing technology or other cases with massive risks and rewards.

There is some sense in that argument, but it ultimately falls flat. No one wants to see American innovation suffer, but that’s unlikely to happen just because some Chinese companies would no longer have access to the advanced thinking present in American universities and industries.

In fact, slowing the rate of innovation ever so slightly would reap national security benefits by allowing the U.S. and its allies to properly assess the situation and implement proactive controls that anticipate and mitigate coming challenges and potential attack vectors — instead of responding to threats after they have already materialized.

These complex issues require genuine care and stewardship, as noted in an alarming but sober analysis by technology expert Rick Switzer about potential attack vectors to critical infrastructure in an open-source world. It is precisely the task that should be charged to one department or agency accountable to the public.

A Secretary or Department of Digital would be such a solution, and if it were already in place, perhaps the RISC-V risk — or countless other potential issues involving critical infrastructure we haven’t yet considered — would already be solved.

Given the stakes, the American people, and the world that counts on American leadership for security and stability, deserve nothing less.

Robert V. Jones is the CEO of PreSafe Technologies and president of the NYU Tandon School of Engineering alumni association.